Apart from medical emergencies, when is it justified for gynaecologists, and obstetricians to deviate from informed consent without reverting back to their patients? by Naidoo, Loshinee.
APART FROM MEDICAL EMERGENCIES, WHEN IS IT JUSTIFIED FOR 
GYNAECOLOGISTS, AND OBSTETRICIANS TO DEVIATE FROM 
INFORMED CONSENT WITHOUT REVERTING BACK TO THEIR 
PATIENTS? 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
LOSHINEE NAIDOO 
(8727531) 
 
 
Submitted in part fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of: 
 
 
 
 
Masters in Medical Law 
 
 
University of Kwa Zulu Natal: Howard College Campus 
School of Law 
College of Law and Management Studies 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. David J. McQuoid- Mason 
 
 
May 2018 
  
 2 
PREFACE 
 
 
I wish to convey my sincere and heartfelt gratitude to the following persons: 
 
 Professor David J. McQuoid-Mason, for his guidance, patience, tolerance and support; 
 
 Rajan Naidoo, my husband, Dr Yernush Naidoo, my son and Miss Aishwari Naidoo, my 
daughter, for their motivation, encouragement, understanding, patience and endurance; 
 
 Editors Mr Shepard Kahn and Ms. Nicci Whitear for their time, effort and guidance. 
 
 
 My friends, staff members of our law firm and family members who assisted with 
collecting information from online sources, submitting electronic messages, sourcing and 
purchasing books and who showed an interest in my work throughout this period; 
 
 The lecturers and staff at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Howard College Campus, 
School of Law, for being an invaluable source of support and direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
SUMMARY 
 
 
Medical care relies on a bond of trust between the patient and caregiver and on the patient’s 
ability to make free and informed choices, to understand and guide the course of their care. 
Informed consent is the foundation of this trust, ensuring that the patient is adequately 
informed so as to best understand their options and decide their treatment path. Informed 
consent is an express legal mandate granted by a patient to a healthcare practitioner after 
consultation. The patient relies on the provided information when choosing to accept, reject, 
or seek to modify a proposed intervention. The patient is protected by Statutes that dictate the 
manner in which informed consent must be obtained, requiring that relevant information be 
provided in such a way that the patient understands the nature, intended effect, and risk or 
consequence associated with the intervention. In many cases, it must be established if the 
patient has the legal capacity to consent or not. 
 
This research topic will consider how proper enforcement of informed consent practices, 
procedures, and the implementation of current policies and rules in gynaecology and 
obstetrics may prevent cases of gross negligence, unlawful assault or the compromising of 
patient rights under the Constitution, the common law and specifically, the criminal law. 
 
The study aimed at:  
 
1.  Investigating under which circumstances, despite current legislation, policies and 
procedures, health practitioners choose and still adopt a paternalistic approach 
towards patients in their care in the field of gynaecology and obstetrics, which leads 
to deviations from the requirements of informed consent; 
 
2.  Obtaining explanations for cases where doctors, particularly in gynaecology and 
obstetrics, neglect patient autonomy and the need for informed consent, and are seen 
to deviate from their ethical and legal obligations, and actively make decisions that 
properly belong to the patients. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1    The purpose of the study 
 
Prior to the adoption of modern practices, the healthcare system used the paternalistic 
approach. Although doctors applied the principles of beneficence (best interest) and non-
maleficence (no harm), when treating their patients,
1
 they did not necessarily place 
importance on self-determination or consider the right to refusal. Typically, under the old 
paradigm, the doctor was exclusively involved in choosing the medical interventions for their 
patients, based solely on their expert knowledge and opinion, believing it to be in their 
patients’ best interest, even if it was contrary to their immediate desires or freedom of choice.2  
 
Marsh states that with the very long history of such practice by the medical fraternity, 
informed consent can be difficult for doctors to communicate and apply in person, to lay 
people in such a manner, and to communicate in such a way that the patiently understands 
sufficiently to make an informed decision.
3
  There is a need for education, training, 
communication skills and language proficiency within the medical fraternity. Further, the 
national and spoken language of the people of the community must be incorporated into the 
medical curriculum or the introduction of services of other professionals and translators must 
be engaged to aide communication. 
 
Our current legal system requires patient autonomy and self-determination with exceptions 
only for specific circumstances.
4
 This policy reflects freedom of choice, and promotes and 
encourages patients to participate in a rational decision making process affecting their health 
status.
5
 Any interference with a treatment course or medical intervention made absent 
informed consent, without adequate reason is considered a ‘violation of a person’s right to 
control his own body’6 and rights to bodily integrity and security under the Constitution.7 
                                                 
1 MA Dada and DJ McQuoid Mason Introduction to Medico-Legal Practice (2001) 36. 
2 A Dhai and DJ McQuoid- Mason op cit 14 at 69 
3 BT Marsh op cit34 at 35 
4 Section 7 and Section 8 of The National Health Act 61 of 2003, 
5 Carstens P and Pearmain D Fundamental Principles of South African Medical Law (2007) 883 “ Pivotal to the 
application of the doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law, is an understanding of the broader 
purpose and function of the doctrine. According to Van Oosten these are two fold: - to ensure the patient’s right to 
self determination and freedom of choice; and – to encourage rational decision-making by enabling the patient to 
weigh and balance the benefits and disadvantages of the proposed intervention in order to come to an enlightened 
choice either to undergo or refuse it”. 
6 Stoffberg and Elliot 1923 CPD 128, also cited in P Carstens and D Pearmain: Fundamental principles of South 
African Medical Law, 879 at footnote 44: ‘The plaintiff claimed 10 000 pounds in damages for assault. The 
Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for surgical and medical treatment for cancer of the penis. Dr. Elliot, who 
treated the plaintiff was an honorary visiting surgeon who assumed the administrative procedures, including, the 
obtaining the patient’s consent had been followed. He was doing charitable work at the hospital. The patient’s 
 7 
 
Informed consent requires more than just a signed form. It is a process which encompasses 
the medical practitioners’ input whereby he/she provides recommendations; shares their 
reasoning for the chosen medical intervention(s) in lay person’s terms, and at the same time 
assesses the patients’ understanding thereof.8 Health professionals are expected to give the 
patient appropriate and adequate information, all pitched to their level of understanding.
9
 This 
ensures that ‘adequate information becomes a requisite of knowledge, appreciation and 
acquiescence and, therefore, also of consent.’10 
 
There is an implied duty by the doctor to examine and treat the patient with knowledge and 
skill, to work in the best interest of the patient and perform a variety of functions, including 
examining, diagnosing, formulating a treatment and/or prevention plan and to advise the 
patient on their diagnosis, on self-care, and to provide and explain medication when 
necessary.
11
 A doctor who fails in their charge may be held liable for a breach of contract.
12
 
 
The mere submission of the patient to a healthcare facility or a doctor in private practice does 
not imply that the patient has automatically consented to treatment.
13
 Neither is it indication 
that they waive their right to security of person, or to be involved in the decision-making 
process with respect to any medical interventions they might require.  
 
A person, who goes to a hospital or treatment center for elective treatment, will contract with 
the doctor or delegated health personnel duly authorized to do so on behalf of the doctor, who 
will provide the treatment and care to the patient.
14
 As it is not always possible for the 
attending doctor to obtain the consent, he or she must ensure that the patient has been given 
sufficient time and all necessary information to make an informed decision about his or her 
medical treatment by a suitably qualified and trained delegate. It is problematic when either 
the delegated health professional or the attending doctor, namely does not comply with the 
HPCSA’s guidelines on consent nor do they fully understand the risks and benefits of the 
                                                                                                                                           
penis was surgically removed. The patient maintained that he had not given consent to the operation. The jury 
found for the defendant.” 
7 Section 12(2)(b)The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  Act 108 of 1996.     
8  Jessica De Bord, ‘Informed Consent’ Ethics in Medicine, University of Washington School of Medicine. 
Available at: bioethx@u.wasington.edu (accessed 16 May 2015). 
9 N.Hoppe and J.Miola op cit  40 at38. 
10 Carstens P and Pearmain D Fundamental Principles of South African Medical Law (2007) 879. 
11 N.Hoppe and J Miola op cit 40 at 38. 
12  L.C Coetzee and Pieter Carstens Medical Malpractice and Compensation in South Africa (2011) 86 Chi-
Kent.L.Rev. 1263. 
13 HPCSA Guidelines, Seeking Patients’ Informed Consent: The Ethical Considerations, Booklet 9, para 15 
(2008). 
14 Carstens P and Pearmain D Fundamental Principles of South African Medical Law (2007) 877. 
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proposed treatment.
15
 Within the public health sector, the state can be held vicariously liable 
for its employee’s wrongful conduct as these employees act in the course and scope of their 
duties,
16
 during the delivery of the medical treatment and /or service. 
 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate and explore the tendency of gynaecologists 
and obstetricians to deviate from informed consent without reverting back to their 
patients, despite the existence of both legal and ethical imperatives to do so, in keeping 
with patient autonomy and right to informed consent. I will demonstrate that health care 
practitioners are still paternalistic and/or alternatively, have limited knowledge of legal 
principles, ethical guidelines and protocols regarding informed consent. Informed consent 
is of paramount importance to a woman’s sexual and reproductive health and self–
determination. When informed consent is neglected, the patient is deprived of the 
information or the opportunity to give or withhold consent for a given medical 
intervention. The fields of Gynaecological and obstetric are specialist services, involving 
sexual health and reproduction, which are particularly sensitive in nature and necessitates 
the greatest caution, and has a unique potential for lasting physical and psychological 
harm, for which legal recourse is a necessity.
17
 The objective of study is to show that 
South African case law on informed consent, South African legislation together with the 
Constitution to do not use a uniform standard of information disclosure. Comparisons of 
foreign common law jurisdictions like United Kingdom, India and Canada will illustrate 
how the courts in South Africa are indecisive and fluctuate between the reasonable doctor 
standard of information disclosure and the prudent patient standard of information 
disclosure in relation to international jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Booklet 9, Section 2. 1 of the HPCSA: Seeking Patient’s informed consent: The Ethical Considerations (2008) 
guidelines state that: ‘ Successful relationship between health care practitioners and patients depend upon mutual 
trust. To establish that trust practitioners must respect patient autonomy- their right to decide whether or not to 
undergo any medical intervention, even where a may result in harm to themselves or in their own death. Patients 
must be given sufficient information in a way that they can understand, to enable them to exercise their right to 
make informed decisions about their care. That is what is meant by informed consent.’  
16 D.Mcquoid-Mason ‘Establishing liability for harm caused to patients in a resource-deficient environment’ 
(2010) 100 (9) SAMJ 573. 
17 Pepper MS , Slabbert MN ‘Is South Africa on the verge of a medical malpractice litigation storm ?’(2011) 4:1  
South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 29 ‘The Gauteng Department of health and Social development faced 
malpractice claims totaling R 573 million in 2009-2010. The largest payouts have been in obstetrics and 
gynaecology surgery.’ 
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1.2 Methodology 
A desktop research methodology approach was used to investigate and examine case law 
relating to violations of informed consent practices to women’s sexual and reproductive self-
determination. I compared cases, policies, procedures and the legislation of South Africa, 
against comparable legal and medical protocols in the United States, Namibia, the United 
Kingdom, Canada and India. Relevant materials from journal articles, textbooks, newspaper 
and other media assisted me to derive answers as to why practitioners in these essential 
women’s services failed in their ethical duty to respect autonomy and informed consent laws; 
where the practitioner instead adopted a paternalistic manner of service and presumed to 
decide crucial medical matters without first consulting the patient whose self-determination 
should be guaranteed and whose informed consent was required.  
 
I examined opinions that argued for exceptions and attempted to justify some of these 
cases. A broad and comparative evaluation of the argument including the views of legal 
writers, medical practitioners, researchers in the field, statutes and decided cases was 
reviewed to conclude under which circumstances, apart from a medical emergency, it is 
appropriate for a gynaecologist or an obstetrician to deviate from informed consent.  
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1.3 The value of the doctrine of informed consent, where the patient has the right to    
  bodily integrity and self determination, and its relevance in medical law in South   
             Africa 
 
The doctrine of informed consent is enshrined in the Bill of Rights, in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
18
 Although, a person’s right to informed consent 
is not indicated in our Constitution, it can be inferred from rights such as the right to bodily 
and psychological integrity. The doctrine of informed consent is an ethical principle as well 
as a legal requirement for medical practice which is founded on core values of equality,
19
 
human dignity,
20
 life,
21
 freedom and security of the person,
22
 privacy,
23
 freedom of religion, 
belief and opinion,
24
 access to healthcare, food and water, social security,
25
 as well as 
specifically enumerated reproductive and children’s rights.26 These rights are supported by 
the National Health Act,
27
 the National Patients’ Rights Charter28 and the common law,29 as 
                                                 
18 Chapter 2: Bill of Rights of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996. 
19 Section 9 (3) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996: ‘The state may not 
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.’  
20 Section 10 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996: ‘Everyone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected’ 
21 Section 11 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996: ‘Everyone has a right to 
life’ 
22 Especially section 12(2) (a) : ‘Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes the 
right: (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security and control over their bodily; and (c ) not be 
subject to be subject to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent’  
23 In terms of Section 14 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
24 Section 15 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
25 In terms of Section 27 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, ‘Everyone has the 
right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health care; section 27 (3) : ‘No one may be 
refused emergency medical treatment.’ 
26 Especially the S 28(2) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, which provides that 
the child’s best interests are paramount in any decision concerning the child. 
 Section 28(1)(b) provides that children have the right to appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment. It is submitted that this is especially pertinent in light of s 28(2) and the fact that children 
under the age of 12 cannot give decisive informed consent to any medical or surgical treatment other than a 
termination of pregnancy, see the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 s 129(1). This is because ‘appropriate care’ in these 
situations, together with the best interests of the child requires anyone consenting to any medical care on behalf of 
the child to meet both these criteria. It is submitted that this argument is further supported by s 28(1)(c) which 
provides that children have the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic healthcare services and social services. S 129 
of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 states a child who is over the age of 12 and who displays sufficient maturity and 
has the mental capacity to understand both risks and benefits as well as social implications may consent to his or 
her own medical treatment. However, in the case of surgical medical intervention; the child must be assisted by a 
parent or guardian . Where the child does not satisfy the requirements of S 129 the parent or guardian can consent 
to the child’s medical intervention or treatment. S 130 (1)(a) of the Children’s Act provides that a child may 
consent to HIV tests if it is in the child’s best interest and the child is older than 12 years. S 130 (2) stipulates 
circumstances where the child who is younger than 12 years of age and where he or she shows no maturity nor 
understanding of the risks , benefits or social implications of the HIV test, then the parent, guardian or provincial 
head of social, the head of the child protection institution or the superintendent of the hospital can grant consent. 
Lastly, the Children’s Court can be approached if getting consent from previously mentioned sources prove futile.  
27 National Heath Act no. 61 of 2003 
28 “Everyone has the right to be given full and accurate information about the nature of one’s illnesses, diagnostic 
procedures, the proposed treatment and the costs involved for one to make a decision that affects any one of these 
elements” http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/legislation/patientsrights/chartere.html (accessed 09-10-2017) 
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well as the guidelines published by the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA).
30
The HPCSA recognizes that the fundamental rights of autonomy and self-
determination are pertinent to protecting individuals from medical procedures, interventions 
and treatments that require informed consent and risk otherwise, harming or disempowering 
the patient, violating numerous legal guarantees.  
 
Given the wide range of medical presentations of patients, there are specific procedural 
requirements in section 7 of the National Health Act, 2003
31
 which codify the policies 
regarding treatment, medical intervention, and hospitalization of patients who cannot 
meaningfully consent, whilst best attempting to protect the constitutional rights of patients, 
such as their right to life, healthcare, reproductive rights and children’s rights.32  
 
 Although the law allows in certain situations, for medical practitioners to treat a patient 
absence of informed consent; these are applicable only:- 
 
 (a) by way of a court order, for example, the provisions of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act
33
 provide that a person can be forced under 
court order, to surrender to blood testing for HIV, if the suspect is accused of committing a 
sexual assault. This Act makes provisions for the victim of the sexual offence /s or the officer 
investigating the alleged sexual offence to apply for a magistrate’s order for the compulsory 
testing of the alleged offender.
34
 It is important to note that these compulsory testing 
procedures are regulated by the Criminal Law Amendment Act
35
 and not by the National 
Health Act,
36
  
 
 (b) in terms of any law;
37
  
 
(c) when medical practitioners or authorities believe that failure to treat such a patient will 
result in a serious risk to the public;
38
 or  
                                                                                                                                           
29 Raab E L, The parameters of informed consent http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles 
/PMC1280103/(accessed 09-10-2017) ‘Informed consent begins with consideration of the tort of battery, one of 
the oldest forms of legally disfavored conduct. It consists of unpermitted, unprivileged, intentional contact with 
another’s person. The contact need not result in bodily harm; the intended contact itself is the harm.’ 
30 Ames Dhai and David McQuoid - Mason Bioethics, Human Rights and Health Law: Principles and Practice 
(2011) 18: ‘In South Africa, The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), a statutory body in terms 
of the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974, is responsible for setting the standards for the ethical and professional 
conduct of practitioners registered with the Council.’ 
31 Section 7 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, 
32 As referred to in The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
33 Part 2: Section 30 of the Criminal law and Related Matters) Amendment Act No. 32 of 2007. 
34
 Part 2: SS 30-31 of the Criminal law and Related Matters) Amendment Act No. 32 of 2007 . 
35 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matter) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
36 Section 30(1) (a) of the Criminal law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act No. 32 of 2007. 
37 Section 7 (1)(c) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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(d) where failure to render the necessary medical assistance will result in the death or 
irreversible harm to the patient.
39
 
 
 The HPCSA further recognizes ethical concerns surrounding the health risks and wellbeing 
of the HIV positive patient’s sexual partners especially in situations where the patient refuses 
consent to disclose their HIV status to their partner/s. In these situations, the health care 
practitioners are cautioned and guided in using their discretion to divulge the patient’s HIV 
status to their sexual partners taking into account the risks following such disclosure, in 
respect of each patient.
40
 
 
But in many cases, there are no justifications available for ignoring consent laws. A medical 
practitioner will be liable for assault when a patient is wrongfully and unlawfully operated 
upon or treated by a medical practitioner without proper informed consent.
41
 
 
 This is a direct violation of the patient’s constitutional rights of physical bodily integrity and 
security
42
 including their common law and constitutional rights to dignity
43
 and privacy
44
 
more so than that being a violation of law’s protecting patient’s health.45 Therefore it is not 
just interventions that can violate patient rights, but also the dissemination or collection of 
information; improperly obtaining information about a patient, breaching of doctor-patient 
confidentiality, blood testing or screening without the consent, all amount to an invasion of a 
patient’s constitutional right to privacy.46  
 
                                                                                                                                           
38 Section 7 (1) d of The National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
39 Section 7 (1) e of The National Health Act 61 of 2003;Pieter Carstens and Debbie Pearmain Fundamental 
Principles of South African Medical Law (2009) 18. 
40
 HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice with regard to HIV (2008) para 9.2: “ If the patient refuses consent, the 
health care practitioner should use his or her discretion when deciding whether or not to divulge the information to 
the patient’s sexual partner and the risks to the patient (eh, through violence) that may follow such disclosure. The 
decision must be made with great care, and consideration must be given to the rights of all parties concerned. If the 
healthcare practitioner decides to make the disclosure against the patient’s wishes, the practitioner must do so after 
explaining the situation to the patient and accepting full responsibility at all times.” 
41 HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions, Seeking Patient’s Informed Consent: The 
Ethical Considerations. Booklet 9 (2008) at 3.1.5: ‘Health practitioners must not exceed the scope of the authority 
given by a patient, except in an emergency. Therefore, health care practitioners providing treatment or undertaking 
investigations must give the patient a clear explanation of the scope of consent being sought.’ 
42 Section 12(2)(b) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996. 
43 Section 10 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996. 
44 Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996. 
45 F.W. Van Oosten The Doctrine of informed Consent in Medical Law (1991) 455 (unpublished LLM Thesis)     
    University of South Africa 
46 In C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 292 (T) it was held that: ‘the failure to obtain proper 
consent to test a person’s blood after he or she has voluntarily given a blood sample was held to be a violation of 
the person’s constitutional right to privacy’ 
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Consent legitimizes medical treatment that would otherwise be assault, based on the maxim 
“volenti non fit injuria.”47  The South African court examined women’s right to provide 
informed consent to an abortion in the case of Christian Lawyers’ Association v National 
Minister of Health and others
48
 and held that this right was fundamental to individual self-
determination.  
 
An act of medical treatment by a doctor on a patient is not an injustice if the patient is a 
willing participant and submits to treatment with full knowledge of the risks and all the 
consequences of such treatment.
49
 Patients may give consent verbally, in writing, or tacitly by 
conduct.
50
 But it is recommended by the HPCSA that physicians obtain written consent 
whenever possible, so that in the unlikely event of a malpractice suit, consent can be proven 
and the provider protected.
51
 
 
But written consent is not always given or needed. And there is a legal foundation for another 
form of consent called “implied consent,” which is distinct from informed consent. Marsh52 
states that implied consent is present from the moment the patient visits a doctor for advice 
and help; ‘implicit in this consultation is that confidential information will be given, physical 
examination performed and treatment given without asking formally for consent.’53  
 
Marsh stated that historically the concept of implied consent was commonly used in 
gynaecological practice where it was a routine procedure for pregnant women to have blood 
samples taken for routine testing of congenital syphilis, which is harmful to the embryo and 
could be easily treated with the administration of penicillin with no prior consent or 
permission from the patient.
54
   
 
In a study evaluating the quality of informed consent obtained by doctors in their clinical 
practice, 57 percent of those interviewed confirmed that implied or presumed consent was 
                                                 
47 Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148 and Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710, cited in R. 
Thomas ‘Where to from Castell v De Greef? Lessons from recent developments in South Africa and abroad 
regarding consent to treatment and standards of disclosure’ (2007) 124 SALJ 188 : ‘ a person may commit the 
iniuria of assault merely by interfering or attempting to interfere with the body of another’ 
48 Christian Lawyers Association v National Minister of Health and Others 2004 (4) SA 31 (T). 
49 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicae 
Curaie) 2005 (1) SA 509 (T).  
50 Patrick van den Heever Therapeutic Privilege in South African Medical Law (unpublished LLM Thesis 
University of Cape Town, 1997). 
51 Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions, Seeking patient’s Informed Consent: The Ethical 
Considerations. Booklet 9 (2008) para13. 
52 B.T Marsh ‘Informed Consent- help or hindrance?’ (1990) 83 (10) at 603-606 Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine J R Soc Med. www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov>NCBI (accessed 15 May 2015) 
53 B.T Marsh ‘Informed Consent- help or hindrance?’ (1990) 83 (10) at 603-606 Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine J R Soc Med. 
54 B.T Marsh op cit 35. at 603 
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used in emergency situations rather than in ward or clinic situations.
55
  Although a 
significantly high percentage of gynaecologists implement the practice of informed consent in 
the ward or clinical situations, the question one must now ask regarding those doctors who are 
seen to deviate from obtaining the informed consent is: How or from whom do they obtain 
permission to make important health decision and/or treatment choices for their patients? 
 
Sidin states that: ‘Informed consent is related to patient’s rights in terms of attainment of 
better health care’56 which is of paramount importance to the patient. Although informed 
consent is required for each specific procedure, health practitioners and health institutions use 
standard or generic consent forms. Carstens et al contend that this practice must be avoided 
for the simple reason that ‘obtaining of an informed consent for vasectomy is not comparable 
to informed consent to be obtained for endoscopic sinus surgery.’57  
 
Hoppe and Miola highlighted that a valid conception of consent issues require that it be 
mandatory, and consider capacity based on English Law. They stress that a valid improved 
consent requires a combination of all relevant considerations, such as a patients’ capacity to 
consent, risk disclosure, clarity of intended treatment and the presentation of alternatives.
58
 A 
law that fails to recognize any of these aspects is an incomplete one, and can fail patients. 
 
In a healthcare setting, one needs to carefully assess what information is disclosed to the 
patient, whether there is sufficient information supplied to the patient, and whether the patient 
has the mental and legal capacity to make an informed decision before an intervention.
59
  
 
The court in Castell v de Greef60 held that in our South African context the doctor’s duty to 
disclose a material risk is essential in the process of obtaining the patient’s informed consent 
to the operation and for any other post operative procedures. The court held that informed 
consent is a requirement for a defence of volenti non fit injuria to exclude the wrongfulness of 
the assault.  
 
 
                                                 
55 Chima SC ‘ Evaluating the quality of informed consent and contemporary clinical practices by medical doctors 
in South Africa: An empirical study’ (2013) 12  https://www.bmcmedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6939-14-
SI-S3. (accessed 09-10-2017) 
56 Sidin A.I ‘The obstacles of valid informed consent’ (2016) 3 (5) International Invention Journal of medicine 
and Medical Sciences 85-88 ISSN: 2408-72460  
http://internationalinventjournals.org/journals/IIJMMS/Archive/2016/May-vol3 issue (accessed 09-10-2017). 
57 Carstens P and Pearmain D Fundamental Principles of South African Medical Law (2007)  878. 
58 Nils Hoppe and Jose Miola   Medical Law and Medical Ethics (2014). 
59 Nils Hoppe and Jose Miola Medical Law and Medical Ethics (2014) 38. 
60
  Castell v De Greef (1994) SA 408 (C) 425 
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In Castell, Ackerman J further stated: 
 ‘I therefore conclude that, in our law, for a patient’s consent to constitute a   
  justification that excludes the wrongfulness of medical treatment and its 
 consequences, the doctor is obliged to warned patient so consenting of a material risk 
 inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk being material if, in the circumstances of 
 the particular case:  
(a) a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, 
would be likely to attach significance to it; or 
(b) a medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it’61 
 
 
Later in the paper, we shall compare the UK, Canadian and British models regarding ‘risk 
disclosure and informed consent’ and use, negligence and ‘trespass’.62 South African courts, 
unlike British ones, do not apply the Bolam test,
63
 which suggests that a doctor does not act 
negligently if he or she adopts a practice of disclosure which satisfies a responsible body of 
medical opinion, even if others doctors do not adopt this practice.
64
 South African courts 
favor a model that gives priority to the fundamental rights of autonomy and self–
determination, adopting principles from the Australian case of Rogers v Whittaker
65
 when 
adjudicating the standard of care and a person’s right to make independent decisions 
regarding their own lives.
66
 
 
Lord Scarman, in the United Kingdom case of Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem 
Royal Hospital
67
 stated that: 
The Bolam Principle may be formulated as a rule that a doctor is not negligent if he 
acts in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible 
body of medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different practice. In 
short, the law imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of medical 
judgment.
68
 
                                                 
61
 Castell v De Greef (1994) SA 408 (C) 426 
62 Nils Hoppe and Jose Miola Medical Law and Medical Ethics (2014) 38. 
63 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582. 
64 Harberfield. L ‘Informed consent and infant male circumcision’ http://www.cirp.org/library/legal/harberfield 
(accessed 21-09-2017) 
65 Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 487. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital (1985) All ER 643 
68 Ibid. 
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 In the United Kingdom, the roles and duties of gynaecologists (doctors who deal primarily 
with women’s reproductive issues) and obstetricians (doctors who deal women during 
pregnancy and childbirth) seem to be somewhat artificial in spite of them being sub-
specializations.  
Doctors of each specialty frequently practice in both disciplines, as there is a high incidence 
of claims brought on behalf of infants, mostly alleging brain damage, and mothers having 
substantial claims for maternal injury or by their spouses in the event of the mother’s death.69 
 
1.4 The relevance of informed consent in the field of gynaecology and obstetrics 
 
This study endorses the need for the proper enforcement of practices, procedures and policies, 
considering both domestic and international rules, with respect to informed consent within the 
field of gynaecology and obstetrics. If implemented effectively and with strict measures, these 
polices can do as intended and reduce incidents of negligence, unlawful assault and other 
conduct by medical professionals that negatively impacts on a woman’s sexual and 
reproductive self-determination.
70
 They will also protect the patient’s rights in terms of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
71
 especially that of dignity, and of psychological 
and bodily integrity, protected by the National Health Act,
72
 the common law
73
 and in the 
criminal law.
74
 
 
There is a need for gynaecologists and obstetricians to move away from their paternalistic 
approaches, in the hope that this will reduce deviation from lawful informed consent and the 
number of ensuing medical negligence cases being brought against them.
75
 This is especially 
the case, for example, for a woman undergoing labor or childbirth, or in a similarly 
distressing situation, and where she may not be able to understand the unfolding of events, 
especially complicated or unforeseen ones. As a result, they may not be capable of giving 
proper informed consent to any additional surgical or medical interventions, such as an 
epidural. Here, a doctor may be faced with legal and ethical challenges such as a woman in 
                                                 
69 M.Powers and N.Harris Clinical Negligence 2nd ed (1994) 920. 
70 Section 12 of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) provides that: ‘ Everyone has a right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right:- (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;(b) to security in 
and control over their body; and(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed 
consent.’ 
71 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 
72 The National Health  Act 61 of 2003 
73 G.A. Ogunbanjo and D. Knapp van Bogaert ‘ Ethical issues in family practice: Informed consent- Disclosure of 
information in Clinical Practice’ (2004) 46(3) SA Fam Prac 35-37 ‘Common law codifies a conviction that people 
have a fundamental right to self-determination, namely to control their own lives and bodies.’ 
74 The Criminal law (Sexual offences and related matters) Amendment Act No. 32 of 2007. 
75 G.Howarth and P.Carstens ‘ Can private obstetric care be saved in South Africa? (2014) 7 (2) SAJBL 69-73. 
DOI : 10.7196/SAJBL.319  http://www.sajbl.org.za/index.php/sabjl/article/ (accessed 21-09-2017) 
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labor lacking the mental capacity to make an informed decision owing to the fatigue and labor 
pain she is experiencing, and the doubt cast on the validity of her consent.
76
  
 
A study conducted on the poor quality of informed consent showed that 71 per-cent of 
physicians surveyed failed to fully explain the risks of complications,
77
 and a study conducted 
on the trends in malpractice claims for obstetric and gynaecological procedures between 2005 
and 2014 showed that the most litigated category of procedure was for operative procedures 
on the uterus with indemnity claims 27 per cent higher than a combination of all medical 
specialties.
78
 
 
The nature and scope of gynaecology and obstetrics include the care and treatment of two 
patients; namely the unborn child as well as the mother. This broadens and multiplies the 
seriousness and potential harm of violations of patient rights. Demonstrating this, claims for 
compensation for medical malpractice are usually made against medical practitioners for the 
following reasons: (a) adverse effects and the inefficacy of oral contraception and intra-
uterine devices such as the coil; (b) those arising in surgery, example where the patient is 
subject to unnecessary operations; sterilizations because of infections; internal injuries 
sustained during keyhole surgery including to the bowel, bladder and uterus; hemorrhaging 
and the failure to detect it; and (c) medical issues relating to failure of sterilization or failure 
to terminate a pregnancy.
79
 
 
Medical practitioners in the field of gynaecology and obstetrics are inconsistent in their 
approach to informed consent despite their ethical and legal obligations.
80
 Ethical issues may 
arise in situations where a patient and doctor disagree on a proposed gynaecological or 
obstetric treatment or intervention.
81
 Doctors are obliged to disclose all risks and benefits to 
their patients and to give them the opportunity to make decisions for themselves and their 
unborn child provided that they are qualified to give or refuse consent.
82
  
 
                                                 
76 Elizabeth J. Buechler ‘Informed Consent Challenges in Obstetrics’ CRICO/RMF  FORUM  September (2007) 
19-20  https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/~/mediafiles (accessed 19 November 2015) 
77 Gogos AJ, Clark RB, Bismark MM, Gruen RL, Studdert DM ‘When informed consent goes poorly: a 
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Aust. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21929499 ( accessed 20-09-2017) 
78 Glaser LM, Alvi FA, Milad MP ‘ Trends in Malpractice claims for obstretric and gynaecologic procedure, 2005 
through 2014’  September (2017) 217 (3) Am J Obstet Gynaecol https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28549980 
( Accessed 06-10-2017) 
79 Carstens P and Pearmain D Fundamental Principles of South African Medical Law (2007) 718-719. 
80 M.Black ‘Vaginal birth comes with risks too- so should it really be the default option?’ The Conversation (2016) 
7 http://theconversation.com/ (accessed: 21/09/2017). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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Special attention must be given to women who choose the natural vaginal delivery method of 
childbirth as they are also at risk of unfavorable outcomes.
83
 Many women are not fully aware 
of the possible dysfunction of their pelvic floor, additional risks associated with an 
epesiotomy and possibility of incontinence post-delivery.  Although the previously mentioned 
unique risks of vaginal delivery seem daunting when communicated to an expectant mother it 
must be balanced with the risks associated with Caesarian section deliveries. Patients very 
often do not know that the mortality of mother and/or child is significantly higher in 
Caesarian section deliveries when it is administered as an emergency procedure rather than 
pre-planned.
84
 
 
The American College of Obstetrician-Gynaecologists (ACOG)
85
 recognizes that 
obstetricians can face challenges in their treatment of an expectant mother when further 
treatment is required and consent issues arise. Should the obstetrician believe that a patient’s 
refusal to consent to a certain procedure has an increased likelihood to be to the detriment of 
her unborn child, the obstetrician can elect to make one of three choices to reach a desirable 
outcome;  
  (1) agree to respect the patient’s decision-making; 
(2) decline to participate further and transfer the patient’s care to another   
     provider; or 
 (3) seek intervention of the courts.
86
 
 
Legally competent patients have the right to refuse health care services.
87
 Patients refusing 
medical services should therefore not be treated without their consent.
88
 In the British case of, 
B v NHS Hospital Trust,
89
 the patient, who was paralyzed from the neck downward and was 
sustained by a ventilator, refused treatment.  
 
Initially, two psychiatrists confirmed that she was incompetent to refuse the life-saving 
treatment. A further assessment from an independent psychiatrist found to the contrary. 
Despite her refusal to be treated, the physicians ignored the instruction of the patient, as they 
believed that her prognosis was good and that her condition would improve in a rehabilitation 
unit. Ms B was awarded damages for technical assault and Justice Butler-Sloss P stated that 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 A. Dhai, J Gardner, Y Guidozzi, G. Howarth, M. Vorster Deliveries- is there a need for documented consent? 
South African Medical Journal (2011) 101:1 SAMJ. at 20-22 
85 Elizabeth J. Buechler op cit 56. 
86 ACOG Committee on Ethics: Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 2nd ed “Patient Choice in the maternal-fetal 
relationship” Washington DC: The American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologits (2004). 
87 J.K. Mason and G.T Laurie Law and Medical Ethics (2011) 8th ed. 
88 J.K. Mason and G.T Laurie Law and Medical Ethics (2011) 8th ed. 
89 B v NHS Hospital Trust (2002) 2 [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) 
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‘… a competent patient has an absolute right to refuse treatment irrespective of the 
consequences of her decision,’90 and issued very clear guidance to health care professionals as 
to their responsibility in such cases.  
 
In emergencies where any delay in the provision of the health service might result in a 
patient’s death or irreversible damage to their health, treatment may be given provided that 
they have not expressly, implicitly, or by conduct, refused that service.
91
  
 
The question remaining is this; apart from a medical emergency, when can gynaecologists 
and obstetricians justifiably deviate from informed consent without reverting back to their 
patients, and under what specific circumstances is this permissible?  
                                                 
90 B v NHS Hospital Trust (2002) 2 [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam) 
 
91 Section 7 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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Chapter 2: Concepts pertinent to the doctrine of informed consent 
  
Informed consent is a specific mandate granted by a patient, with legal capacity to consent, to 
a healthcare practitioner and legitimizes the treatment process under normal circumstances.  
The patient, after being consulted by a healthcare practitioner, can choose to voluntarily 
accept or reject the medical treatment, intervention or procedure based on adequate 
information supplied by the healthcare professional.
92
 For consent to constitute a justification 
that excludes medical treatment and consequences, the patient must be adequately informed 
of the benefits and material risks in a language in which he/she understands. It is imperative 
that the nature, effects and side effects, and consequences of each medical intervention 
options are communicated to the patient. Based on the information received, the patient can 
accept the treatment or exercise his/ her right of refusal of medical services, and in that event 
is told the risks, implications and consequences of such refusal.
93
 
 
Informed consent as defined in terms of Subsection 6(1) read with Subsection 7(3) of the 
National Health Act, 2003 is ‘consent given by a person with legal capacity and who has been 
informed of: 
 ‘his/ her health status (except in circumstances where there is substantial evidence 
that the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to their best interests); 
 the range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available; 
 the benefits, risks, costs and consequences generally associated with each option; and 
 his/her right to accept or refuse health services and the implications, risks, obligations 
of such refusal.’94 
 
Apart from medical emergencies and the legal justification of necessity, all medical 
treatments, procedures or interventions administered to patients without first obtaining 
informed consent will constitute an assault and are deemed wrongful.
95
 
In non-emergency situations, specific care and treatment plans must be consented to and not a 
generalized consent to care. Patients will also have the time to reflect on all risks and benefits 
of the intended treatment and have a right to change their decision if they wish to. 
 
 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Section 6 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003: User to have full knowledge 
94 Section 6(1) and Section 7(1) of The National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
95 Broude v McIntosh (1998) (3) SA 60; Castell v De Greef (1994) SA 408 (C).  
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Concepts pertinent to the doctrine of informed consent will be discussed to the extent that will 
illustrate how it holds value to achieve a successful healthcare system, for example if there 
exists a doctor-patient relationship based on open and clear channels of communication, trust, 
confidentiality, adherence to strict protocol by medical professionals in medical emergencies 
including the acknowledgement and implementation of their ethical codes and the law.  
 
The key elements for a consent to be considered valid are :- 
(1)  legal capacity of the patient (which is determined by his or her mental or decisional  
      capacity as well as the patient’s age ), 
(2) voluntariness of the patient to freely consent to or refuse treatment ( which consent must   
      be obtained without duress or coercion), 
(3 ) information given to the patient (ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to communicate   
       information on the nature of the treatment, risks and benefits of the treatment ,   
       anticipated outcomes , and consequences of refusing treatment). 
 
 
2.1 The legal capacity of the patient 
 
The doctor who enters into a contractual relationship with the patient has duty to act and treat 
the patient according to good medical practice.
96
  Failure of a medical practitioner to respect a 
patient’s right to bodily integrity will face civil or criminal claims for assault brought by the 
patient and/or a complaint to the HPCSA regarding their illegal and/or unethical conduct. 
 
 The patient’s age and their mental or decisional capacity must be considered well in advance 
by the healthcare practitioner, to establish whether or not the patient has the legal capacity to 
grant or refuse consent to treatment. Consent can be obtained orally or in writing or tacitly by 
conduct.
97
 
  
The age at which a patient has the legal capacity to exercise his /her rights is determined by 
legislation. With regard to consent from children in South Africa, Sections 129 of the  
Children’s Act 98  allows a child older than 12 years old, and who has shown sufficient 
maturity and mental capacity, to acknowledge and understand the benefits, risks and social 
                                                 
96 DJ McQuoid Mason and Mohamed Dada a-z of Medical Law (2011)166, “Definition: The doctor- patient 
relationship refers to a situation where a doctor undertakes to treat a patient, and the patient agrees to be treated by 
the doctor.” 
97 Patrick van den Heever Therapeutic Privilege in South African Medical Law (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Cape Town (1997) 23. 
98 Section 129 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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implications of the medical service, to consent to his or her “medical treatment”99 and with 
regard to  “surgical” 100  operation/s  he/ she must duly assisted by his or her parent or 
guardian. On the other hand a parent’s or a guardian’s consent is required for a child who is 
younger than 12 years older and also in those circumstances where the child lacks the 
requisite mental capacity and understanding of the benefits, risks and implications of the 
procedure.
101
 
 
Under Section 129(6) of the Children’s Act, consent can be obtained from the Superintendent 
of the hospital or other appropriate authority figure given the circumstances, absent the 
parents or guardians, or where (i) the medical services is vital to save the child’s life or to 
prevent a serious injury or disability; (ii) the urgency for the medical service is so great that it 
cannot be delayed until informed consent is obtained first.
102
 
 
 
Section 130(1)(a) of the Children’s Act provides that a child may consent to an HIV tests if it 
is their “best interest” and the child is older than 12 years. Section130 (2) stipulates under 
which circumstances consent can be obtained for the child, who is younger than 12 years of 
age, and where he or she shows no maturity, nor understands the risks, benefits or social 
implications of the HIV test.
103
 Under those circumstances, then the parent, guardian or 
provincial head of social, the head of the child protection institution or the superintendent of 
the hospital can grant consent. Lastly, the Children’s Court can be approached if getting 
consent from previously mentioned significant others or authorized personnel is unobtainable.  
 
The question of capacity to consent was clarified by Mojapelo J in the case of Christian 
Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others
104
 where is was held that: 
Valid consent can only be given by someone with intellectual and emotional capacity 
for the required knowledge, appreciation and consent…..what the Choice Act does 
not do however is to fix a rigid age…..instead of using age as a measure of control or 
regulation, the legislature….opted to use capacity to give informed consent as a 
yardstick.
105
  
  
 
                                                 
99 Section 129(2) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
100 Section 129 (3) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
101 Section 129(5) of the Children’s Act 2005. 
102 Section 129(6) of the children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
103 Section 130(1)(a) & Section 130(2)(a)(ii) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
104 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others supra 185 at 15. 
105 Ibid. 
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Currently in South Africa, The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act
106
 allows a woman 
or child of any age permission to give an informed consent to a termination of pregnancy 
procedure. The Act stipulates that if the female is below the age of 18 years, the attending 
health care professional must advise her to consult with her parents or another person whom 
she trusts regarding her decision to terminate the pregnancy; the minor is not obliged to take 
the advice from the health care professional nor can she be prevented from undergoing the 
procedure.
107
 She must however have the maturity, mental capacity and be able to understand 
and appreciate the risks, benefits and enormity of such a procedure when giving her informed 
consent to terminate her pregnancy. 
In the case of Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others
108
 it was argued 
that The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act was unconstitutional for reasons that it 
allowed a person below the age of 18, and therefore insufficiently mature to decide on a 
matter of life and death for the fetus, and to undergo an abortion without her parents’ consent. 
It was held that the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act is constitutional in that 
termination medical procedures required informed consent, implying that the female child had 
knowledge and appreciation of the knowledge.
109
 
 
The provisions of the Sterilization Act
110
 on the other hand is seen to be in contrast to the 
ruling in the Christian Lawyers Association case relating to informed consent as it strictly 
regulates the reproductive rights of minors stipulating that females under the age of 18 years 
and minors are not allowed to consent to a sterilization procedure.
111
 Minors who’s health will 
be jeopardized during the pregnancy, can be sterilized on condition that their parent’s and/ or 
guardian’s consent was first obtained and secondly, that an independent medical practitioner, 
after a consultation with the minor, makes a written statement that the sterilization procedure 
would favor the best interest of the child.  Special procedures are required in the case of 
mentally incompetent minors, in terms of the Sterilization Act.
112
 The medical superintendent 
is required to convene a panel of experts to assess the request for the sterilization procedure 
                                                 
106 Sections 5(1) and 5 (2) of the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.’….no consent other than 
that of the pregnant woman shall be required for the termination of a pregnancy.” For the purposes of the Act “ 
woman” means a female of any age. 
107 Section 5(3) of the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 ‘… in the case of a pregnant minor, a 
medical practitioner or a registered midwife, as the case may be, shall advise such minor to consult with her 
parents, guardian, family members or friends, before the pregnancy is terminated. Provided that the termination of 
the pregnancy shall not be denied because such minor chooses not to consult them.’ 
108 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of health and others 2005 (1) SA 509 (T). 
109 Ibid. 
110 Sterilization Act 44 of 1998. 
111 Section 2 of the Sterilization Act 44 of 1998. 
112 Section 3 of the Sterilization Act 44 of 1998. 
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and determine whether or not the continued pregnancy or the childbirth will ‘constitute a real 
or material threat to the minor’s physical health’113 and wellbeing.114  
 
In emergency situations involving children, where a person with parental responsibility to 
give the necessary consent is unavailable, then the Superintendent or in his or her duly 
nominated delegate, can award the consent only for the limited medical treatment or 
intervention, which is required in such emergency. 
115
 
 A doctor faced with an emergency situation where the patient is unable to consent, for 
example, due to unconsciousness, he or she can rely on the concept of ‘therapeutic necessity’ 
to carry out the emergency medical procedure or treatment.
116
 
 
2.2     Voluntariness of the patient  
 
Where medical and/or surgical intervention is required and the child concerned unreasonably 
refuses to give his or her consent, then consent can be obtained from The Minister of Social 
Development.
117
 Furthermore, to ensure that the best interest of the child is protected,
118
 
consent for the child’s medical treatment and or operation can be also be sought from the 
Minister of Social Development in circumstance where a parent or guardian: (i) unreasonably 
refuses to give consent (ii) lacks the capacity to assist the child or giving consent, (iii) cannot 
be traced, or (iv) is deceased.
119
 
 
In the case of a patient who is a young child or a mentally or psychologically incapacitated 
person, such patient is deemed to have diminished capacity to consent.
120
 Consequently, such 
a patient cannot willfully submit to medical treatment, neither by tacit or presumed consent, 
as they do not possess the legal capacity to give a valid informed consent.
121
  
 
                                                 
113 Carstens P and Pearmain D Fundamental Principles of South African Medical Law (2007) 905. 
114 Section 3 of the Sterilization Act 44 of 1998. 
115
 HPCSA Guidelines, Seeking Patients’ Informed Consent: The Ethical Considerations, Booklet 9, par 9.5.6 
(2008). 
116 Carstens P and Pearmain D Fundamental Principles of South African Medical Law (2007) 919 
117 Section 129(8) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
118 DJ McQuoid-Mason ‘Can Children Aged 12 years refuse life saving treatment without consent or assistance 
from anyone else?’ (2014) 104 SAMJ 466.  
119 Section 129(7) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
120  MA Dada and DJ McQuoid Mason Introduction to Medico-Legal Practice (2001) 9 “ A submission to 
treatment by a patient does not amount to consent. Where, however, patients who are capable of manifesting their 
will submit themselves to medical treatment in the full knowledge of the nature thereof, and offer no resistance or 
make no objection to such treatment, the inference will generally be drawn that they have tacitly consented. This 
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121 MA Dada and DJ McQuoid Mason Introduction to Medico-Legal Practice (2001) 9. 
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Section 8 of the NHA recognizes the right of patients to exercise their autonomy and self-
determination by allowing them to participate in a decision-making process by making 
choices pertaining to their own health care regime and treatment.
122
 Where a patient is unable 
to grant the requisite informed consent, a health care provider can provide a service to a 
patient without obtaining informed consent under the following circumstances as prescribed 
by the provisions of section 7 of the NHA.
123
 
 
If consent is to be given by way of substituted consent, then the patient who is capable of 
understanding must first be consulted even though they lack the capacity to consent.
124
 The 
National Health Act has made provision for the user of the medical service to participate in 
the decisions relating to his or her medical treatment.
125
 
 
VRM v Health Professions Council of South Africa
126
 dealt with a doctor who was conducting 
tests on a pregnant woman for HIV and a blood samples were being taken for routine tests 
where a valid consent was not obtained. The woman was not given the mandatory pre-test 
HIV counseling nor was she referred to any counseling facilities.
127
 When disputes arose, the 
doctor claimed to have warned the plaintiff that he was conducting tests for HIV, a claim the 
plaintiff denied.  
 
The plaintiff had delivered a stillborn baby by Caesarian section. A day later, the doctor 
informed VRM of her HIV status and that the baby had been stillborn due to her HIV status. 
The enquiry by the HPCSA found that the doctor’s conduct had not been improper or 
disgraceful for failure to provide immediate information regarding the patient’s HIV status 
prior to the delivery and that no further action should be taken against him. However, VRM 
applied to the Pretoria High Court to review that matter, which set aside the decision. The 
court dismissed the application holding that the consent obtained sufficed for legal purposes, 
even though it did not qualify as informed consent under HPCSA guidelines. It was held that 
the difference between consent and informed consent was marginal, and that it was of no real 
consequence that VRM was informed of the outcome of her HIV status at a later stage of her 
pregnancy. 
 
VRM was granted leave to Appeal to the full bench of the Pretoria High Court on the basis 
that the court a quo had erred by failing to take into consideration the guidelines and 
                                                 
122 Section 8 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
123 Section 7 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
124 Section 8(2)(a) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003.  
125 Section 8(1)of the National Health Act 61 of 2003.  
126 VRM v Health Professions Council of South Africa  (2003) JOL 11944 (T). 
127 Ibid. 
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counseling protocol of the HPCSA, and that the HPCSA is itself bound by statute to address 
complaints of improper and disgraceful conduct. The Appeal court set aside the previous 
decision and referred the complaint back to the disciplinary committee of the HPCSA for 
inquiry to be thoroughly investigated and dealt with.
128
 
 
Similarly, in the case of C v Minister of Correctional Services,
129
 it was held that taking a 
blood sample from a prisoner without following proper informed consent protocol constituted 
an invasion of privacy. The court held that although the prisoner consented to his blood being 
removed, he did not consent to it being tested for HIV. The conduct of the prison officers in 
testing the prisoner’s blood for HIV and the lack of pre-and post-test HIV counseling, an 
important component of informed consent, all amounted to an invasion of privacy.
130
  
 
 
A situation might arise where a gynaecologist while in the midst of the operation may 
stumble across another issue which need remedy or rectification but for which there has been 
no informed consent.
131
 It is advisable for the doctor to complete his or her present operation 
and thereafter, together in consultation with the patient, obtain a new consent in preparation 
for treatment of the second issue.  Traditionally, a paternalistic approach would be for the 
doctor to impose the medical treatment in serving the best interest and welfare of the 
patient.
132
 Currently, medical professionals request that the patient gives consent for each and 
every procedure personally in all circumstances except where the patient is unconscious, 
drunk, is a minor or mentally incapable.
133
 If the patient is unable to consent for reasons such 
as mental incompetence, a ‘substituted consent’ 134  should be obtained from a nominated 
person duly authorized to consent on his or her behalf.
135
 The patient must grant the mandate 
to the substituted person in writing;
136
 the patient must have the legal capacity to delegate 
such authority and the substituted person can have authority to grant consent in terms of any 
law or court order.
137
 
 
                                                 
128 Christa van Wyk ‘Pregnancy and HIV in South Africa: Women’s rights to be informed’ (2007) 70 Tydskrif 
HRHR 584-595. 
129 C v Minister of Correctional Services (1996) 4 SA 292 (T). 
130 MA Dada and DJ McQuoid-Mason Introduction to Medico-Legal Practice (2001) 8-9. 
131 Section 7 (1) (e) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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133 HPCSA Guidelines, Seeking Patients’ Informed Consent: The Ethical Considerations, Booklet 9,para 13(2008). 
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In some situations, for example where the patient is in excruciating pain and is unable to fully 
comprehend the information being delivered by the medical practitioner then he or she can 
voluntarily waive his or her right to receive medical information regarding the nature, 
material risks, anticipated outcomes, consequences and alternatives to the proposed treatment. 
In these circumstances, a substituted consent or proxy consent can be obtained.
138
 
 
Doctors, as well as all other medical professionals, are under an ethical and legal duty to 
respect their patient’s right to privacy, to hold personal information and records of their 
patients as private and confidential unless there is a legitimate obligation to disclose the 
patient’s information. A patient has an expectation of privacy and their personal information 
can only be distributed or shared once prior consent is obtained. 
 
The physician is primarily responsible for confirming that proper consent is obtained prior to 
a medical intervention and cannot rely on other health care providers, like the theatre nurse, to 
ensure the required consent is correctly on file.
139
 A medical practitioner who conducts a 
medical procedure without the necessary consent can be held liable and may be found guilty 
of assault and an invasion of privacy.
140
 
 
Obstetricians are known to delegate duties to midwives during labor and in times of 
delivery.
141
 Midwives are recognized as independent health care practitioners who are able to 
make diagnoses, exercise clinical judgments and administer treatments independently from a 
physician.
142
 The burden and onus of ensuring that the qualifications and the requisite skill 
and diligence of supporting midwives, rests on the obstetrician.
143
 This relationship between 
theatre sisters and attending surgeons in hospitals was discussed in Van Wyk v Lewis and it 
was concluded that obstetricians and gynaecologists both have an obligation to independently 
ensure a reasonable standard of treatment for women for whom they have accepted 
responsibility.
144
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 28 
The theatre sisters and hospital nurses are allied professionals who form a branch of the 
hospital.  
 
In circumstances where the doctor’s own assistants harm or cause injury to a patient, then 
such doctor will be vicariously liable for any wrongdoing by that assistant on the patient. On 
the other hand, a doctor who is  assisted by a health professional who is employed by a health 
facility, will be absolved from liability for the wrongdoings of that health personnel purely 
because he has no control over the health institution’s employee. Here, the doctor cannot be 
held responsible for their wrongful acts or omissions.
145
  
 
In recent unreported matter in South Africa, a gynaecologist, Dr. Danie van der Walt, was 
convicted of culpable homicide in the Witbank Magistrate’s Court in September 2016 
following the death of a mother at the Life Cosmos Private Hospital and was sentenced to five 
years imprisonment on the 27
th
 July 2017.
146
 Expert evidence produced at the HPCSA hearing 
as well as in court revealed that the doctor had failed to examine the patient and manage her 
post-partum heamorrhage. The patient had suffered a third degree perinea tear, which was 
repaired under anesthetic in the delivery room instead of in theatre under general anesthetic. 
An investigation report by a Chief gynaecologist, Dr. Mokete Titus, constituted the most vital 
expert evidence to the hearing and highlighted Van der Walt’s “ substandard” patient care and 
a deviation from informed consent. Dr. Danie van der Walt failed to obtain consent for the 
use of instruments during the baby’s delivery, namely: - the vacuum, which was 
unsuccessfully applied followed by the use of forceps.  The report found that the doctor 
should have been “in-charge” considering the patients’ long 14hour labor and the likelihood 
of excessive bleeding postpartum but instead   Dr. van der Walt gave telephonic instructions 
to the nurses and allowed them to manage his patient. The patient was eventually taken to 
theatre but she suffered a cardiac arrest and died as a result of the lack of adequate medical 
care and attention. 
147
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Patient autonomy and self-determination are of paramount importance in the treatment 
process, requiring a doctor’s respect and regard for a patient’s decisive role in making their 
own medical decisions.
148
  
 
Patients are generally overwhelmed with medical information, stress owing to their medical 
status, and may very often sign consent forms without fully understanding the material risks 
and its implications.
149
 The National Health Act stipulates that a health service may not be 
provided without the user’s consent unless a delay in administration of the service to the user 
will result in his or her death or cause irreversible damage to their health.
150
 In the event 
where the user expressly refused consent, the healthcare practitioner must respect the wishes 
of the patient. The patient cannot be treated at all, even in an emergency.
151
 
 
This principle of self-determination and patient autonomy respects the patient’s health 
decision choices, all-encompassing issues relating to informed consent as well as, the 
patient’s right to privacy in deciding whether or not to join a medical aid scheme or to choose 
to pay cash for their medical treatment.
152
  
 
In the event of a non-emergency situation, the doctor must refer the patient to an alternate 
public medical facility together with a referral letter or alternatively, to a colleague who will 
make the patient aware that the cost of treatment is included in the disclosure requirements 
for informed consent as per the National Health Act
153
 who is charging fees according to the 
medical aid scheme rates.
154
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2.3 Information given to the patient 
 
Doctors are expected to treat their patients fairly and justly.
155
 The nature of the relationship 
between the doctor and patient within obstetrics and gynaecology, is such that in most cases, 
the patient is generally healthy and needs monitoring during the gestation period, guidance 
during her pregnancy, assistance during childbirth and post-natal care. But their most crucial 
role is to step in in the event of complications that could threaten the pregnancy or the health 
of the mother. 
 
Gynaecologists and obstetricians are required by law to exercise greater skill and care than 
general physicians and surgeons.
156
 The doctrine of informed consent must thus be dealt with 
in two phases: Firstly, where the doctor provides a comprehensive and detailed discussion of 
the treatment and risks involved as well as present alternate treatment options in a language 
and in a manner ensuring that the patient fully understands the nature and severity of risks and 
chooses to move forward in that knowledge; and secondly, the doctor must obtain a signed 
consent form from the patient except when such consent is not possible and medical urgency 
requires decisive action.
157
 
 
The provisions of Section 6 (2) of the National Health Act stipulate further that health care 
providers, in addition to ascertaining the patient’s level of understanding of the information 
being communicate to them in their own language, also need to take into account the patient’s 
level of literacy when obtaining the patient’s informed consent.158  
 
All patients despite their level of literacy, understanding, value system and linguistic group, 
must be allowed the opportunity to exercise their right to be the master of their own bodies. A 
gynaecologist should be especially vigilant in obtaining consent from his/her patient prior to a 
surgical procedure, as they are aware of the test results, the medical investigation and are able 
to plan and discuss strategies for the treatment, and/or alternative treatments in preparation for 
the anticipated outcomes.
159
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In the case of Rogers v Whitaker
160
 it was held that before an informed consent can be said to 
be given by the patient, it must be shown that such patient was given all the information 
regarding the operation by the provider, warned of the inherent risks in the operation or 
treatment and that the provider communicated in a manner that the patient will understand it.  
 
An acceptance of the risk occurs when the patient is fully informed of the benefits and risks 
of the procedure and treatment and makes an informed choice to proceed with the 
treatment.
161
 
 
The law relating to the failure to warn a patient was considered in the case of Chappel v 
Hart
162
 where the importance of a disclosure of material risks of the operation to the patient in 
obtaining informed consent was evaluated. The pertinent question raised was: “ what would 
the patient have done if warned of the risk?
163
 
Mrs Hart’s oesophagus was perforated during surgery and because of the presence of bacteria 
the quality of her voice was affected. When Mrs Hart expressed concerns about the 
procedure, Dr Chappel informed her of the benefits of the procedure and warned her of the 
risk of perforation to the oesophagus but not that it could impair the quality of her voice. The 
Supreme Court of New South Wales held in favor of Mrs Hart’s and found that the surgeon 
was liable for failing to warn her of a previously unreported complication of the procedure. 
Mrs Hart’s case rested on the fact that if warned of the risk of damage to her vocal cords, she 
would have differed the procedure and sought services from a more experienced surgeon.
164
 
 
A doctor cannot merely make recommendations expecting the patient to envisage problems 
and thereafter formulate question/s, which may arouse concern and doubt. The doctor must be 
unbiased throughout the process so as to prevent his or her views to influencing the patient’s 
decision.
165
 
 
The judicial recognition of a doctor’s duty to inform, and the doctrine of informed consent in 
South Africa was noted as far back as 1923 where Watermeyer J in the Stoffberg v Elliot case, 
stating that everybody has absolute rights, which are justified in law. The right embracing the 
absolute security of the person must be respected. A person has a right to claim damages for 
                                                 
160
 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
161
 ibid 
162 Chappel v Hart (1998) 156 CLR 517 
163
 ibid 
164
 ibid 
165 HPCSA Guidelines, Seeking Patients’ Informed Consent: The Ethical Considerations, Booklet 9 (2008) par 
7.1. 
 32 
any bodily interference, restraint or violations he or she had suffered on account of that 
interference.
166
  
 
The medical professionals must acknowledge the importance of managing a patient’s 
expectations. Conflict and legal action against the medical professional can easily arise if for 
example, a procedure with a low chance of success is not explained, and a patient goes into 
the procedure expecting success, a poor outcome will be particularly distressing. Chima 
explains that challenges to informed consent practices amongst doctors in South African 
public hospitals include language barriers and the lack of interpreters, as well as 
overburdened workload and time constraints.
167
 
 
The case of Al Hamwi v Johnston
168
 dealt with a decision of an expectant mother who spoke 
very little English and did not understand the value of undergoing an amniocentesis 
procedure. Al Hamwi believed that such a procedure would bring harm to her unborn child 
and chose rather than to take this perceived risk, to go without vital obstetric information. Al 
Hamwi’s decision, based on her limited understanding of the vital medical procedures and to 
forego the procedure resulted in her giving birth to a child who was disabled. In this matter, 
the court had to determine what a reasonable disclosure of risks ought to entail, and held that 
the doctor bears the burden to ensure that a patient fully understands the medical procedure. 
Justice Simon did submit that doctors should take ‘adequate steps’ to make the patient 
understand but higher importance must be placed on the actual imparting of information and 
the method of communication of the medical procedure.
169
 Writers Hoppe and Miola 
discussed the flaw in the Al Hamwi case and argued that this case failed to provide guidance 
as to what ‘reasonable’ communication is and it only laid down a legal rule that there is no 
duty on doctors to ensure that the patient ‘understands.’170 
 
Dr. Elizabeth Buechler
171
 further relates a case where a lack of understanding, language 
barrier, a lack of cultural awareness and cultural differences on the part of the healthcare 
provider, cost an expectant mother her baby’s life. The pregnant woman, who was examined 
by a locum obstetrician for the first time in the labor ward and who showed signs of fetal 
distress, was advised by the doctor to have a Caesarian section but refused to do so. The baby 
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was stillborn by vaginal delivery two hours later. It was discovered that many contributory 
factors led to the mother’s decision; that she knew very little English; that she was 
overwhelmed and felt uncomfortable by a new male doctor now treating her, and who had 
insisted on delivering the baby via Ceasarian section. She didn’t realize at the time of the 
examination the value of the caesarian section delivery, owing to her lack of understanding 
and inability to comprehend serious risks to the baby’s birth via the vaginal delivery.172  
 
The decision in Castell v De Greef
173
 is the landmark ruling regarding the standard of 
disclosure required for informed consent to a medical intervention. The court in the Castell 
held that a patient ought to be warned of the material risks and further, for consent to be used 
as a defense,  one needs to satisfy the following: 
a. The person consenting must have had knowledge and must have been aware of the 
nature and the extent of harm or risk; 
b. The person consenting must understand and appreciate the nature and extent of the 
harm or risk; 
c. The person consenting must have given his/her consent to such harm or risk; 
d. The consent granted must be comprehensive and extends to the entire transaction so 
as to include the consequences thereof.
174
  
 
The South African courts adopted patient autonomy rather than medical paternalism and 
regarded the lack of consent as assault on the person instead of negligence and the emergence 
of a reference for using the ‘reasonable patient test’ as a test for informed consent and not the 
‘reasonable doctor test’.175  
Ackerman J, in the Castell case further held that a medical practitioner has the duty to warn a 
patient of the material risk of the intended treatment or procedure and stated that: 
a. A reasonable person in the position of the patient, if so warned of a risk, 
would be likely to attach significance to it, or 
b. The medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the patient, if 
warned would likely to attach significance to it.
176
 
 
 The current expectation within the medical fraternity is to treat patients with respect and to 
prevent them from being at risk of harm during treatment. This stance was adopted after 
studies revealed a high rate of harm and even death of patients due to inadequate adherence to 
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infection control, record keeping, patient understanding medicine labels, injections and 
surgical procedures. The World Medical Association Declaration on patient safety addresses 
these issues by stating that: ‘physicians must go beyond the professional boundaries of health 
care and co-operate with all relevant parties, including patients, to adopt a proactive systems 
approach to patient safety.’177 
 
This obligation placed on the doctor to obtain consent is regulated by law and not by way of 
practice and procedure of their profession. Once again, the importance of training in 
communication and or the employment of interpreters, is required to ensure that every effort 
is made in using their information-sharing and communication skills thereby ensuring that the 
patient is fully informed of the risks and benefits of their treatment or procedure, especially 
during process of voluntarily obtaining consent.
178
  
 
Virus, bacteria, syndromes, terminal illness, medical emergencies are some of the issues that 
the medical fraternity deals with on a daily basis. Medical practitioners may see similarities 
between some patients but ultimately aim to treat each patient based on each individual 
patient’s needs. They usually repeat treatments and remedies previously proven to be 
successful on other patients with similar diagnoses and anticipate similar prognoses.  A doctor 
is not compelled to disclose each and every possible outcome or complication of the intended 
medical treatment, regardless of its likelihood. Some outcomes are so unlikely that a warning 
is not necessitated. But they are obliged to inform the patient of any material risks that may 
arise as a result out of the proposed medical intervention or procedure.
179
 
 
The HPCSA Guidelines
180
 outline the professional responsibilities of a medical practitioner 
during the consent process which state that the medical practitioner should provide the patient 
with information including the purpose of the medical and diagnostic investigation, treatment 
strategies, pain relief and expectations from the procedure or therapies to be administered, 
including common and serious side effects.
181
 
 
Any material risks involved in the procedure or treatment must be discussed with the 
patient.
182
 A medical practitioner, who at any stage recognizes that the patient does not 
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understand the full nature and consequences of the medical treatment, is obliged to halt the 
procedure and explain them fully in order to allow the patient to ultimately make a proper 
informed decision.
183
 Inherent in our diverse cultural society are the challenges of cultural and 
language differences that medical practitioners must factor in when determining the patient’s 
level of competence as suggested by writers Appelbaum and Grisso,
184
 namely:  
a)  The ability to communicate choices; 
b) the ability to understand relevant information upon which the choice is made; 
c) the ability to appreciate the situation according to the patient’s own values; and 
d) The ability to weigh various values to arrive at a decision.185 
 
A failure to fully inform a patient of material risks
186
 or the withholding of vital information 
from a patient is a violation of a medical practitioner’s legal duty.187 After a full disclosure of 
the benefits and material risks of the proposed medical treatment, the patient has an election 
to also make an informed refusal of the treatment. A patient’s right to self-determination and 
autonomous choices is in the exercise of his or her right of refusal or acceptance of a 
suggested procedure or treatment and its alternatives. In the event of a refusal, a doctor is still 
under a duty to fully explain the benefits of the intended procedure or treatment as well as, the 
possibility that such refusal can lead to the further deterioration of their health status.
188
 The 
patient’s final decision must be respected regardless of whether or not others approve.189 The 
refusal of treatment or health service should be recorded by the health care provider and if 
needs be, the patient must be invited and encouraged to seek another professional opinion.
190
 
 
The abovementioned communication skill will assist the doctor to ascertain whether or not 
the communication of information was successful, and to further clarify and correct for a 
patient’s possible unrealistic expectations. Patients may have a different perception of the 
likely outcomes post-treatment, and generally, in practice a patient will sign a consent form 
that broadly describes all anticipated areas of surgery, as well as situations of emergency.
191
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The case of Birch v University College London Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
192
 considered 
the requirement that doctors extend their scope of disclosure to include reasonable 
alternatives to the proposed treatment. Birch’s claim was that her doctor had breached her 
duty by failing to disclose the option of an MRI as an alternative diagnostic procedure with 
far less risk of a stroke than the proposed catheter angiography. The court held in favor of the 
claimant.
193
 The recognition of the value of offering alternative treatment choices to patients 
demonstrates the doctor’s respect for patient autonomy and self-determination in making 
medical choices for themselves.
194
 
 
In the English and Australian legal systems, it has been held that a patient can sue her 
gynaecologist for negligence where she claims to have received inadequate information by 
her doctor to make the necessary informed decision.
195
  
 
An example would be where the patient suffers a so-called common complication of uterine 
perforation during dilatation and curettage procedures that entails the scooping of the lining 
of the uterine walls, as well as serious secondary complications, like bleeding or bowel 
injury.
196
 
 
In our common law, the medical professional is not at liberty to depart materially from the 
agreed intended medical intervention especially where it is radically different from the 
procedure explained and consented to by the patient.
197
 A deviation from the intended medical 
procedure can be justified in situations where: (a) it is in accordance with good medical 
practice; (b) it takes place in good faith; (c) the risks to the patient is not materially increased, 
and (d) it would be against the patient’s medical interest to allow the patient to recover before 
giving the necessary consent. These situations are prevalent in cases of emergency on the 
basis of necessity.
198
 
 
South African courts differ from English and Australian ones in that they support the need for 
full disclosure prior to implementation of the medical intervention, recognizing that a 
deviation from the guidelines in obtaining an informed consent may result in the offending 
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health care personnel being found guilty of an assault, battery or negligence as it is a violation 
of physical integrity.
199
  
 
A study conducted to determine whether the quality of informed consent obtained by South 
African doctors are consistent with standards of practice used locally and internationally 
revealed that the execution of the statutory regulations and laws were inadequate thereby 
requiring the implementation of further education in medical law and ethics to improve the 
quality of informed consent and improved service delivery in South Africa.
200
 But the 
National Health Act protects a doctor who obtains his or her patient’s informed consent and 
discloses all the material risks when obtaining it.
201
 
 
In South Africa it is not legally necessary to obtain a written consent or authorization for a 
normal vaginal delivery.
202
 Vaginal deliveries, like other methods, have their own risks; risks 
of dealing with vacuum assisted or forceps deliveries and injury to the infant and /or mother, 
risks of tearing of the perineum, haemorrhage and incontinence for mothers.
203
 Studies in the 
UK further highlight that 95 percent of women opt for natural vaginal delivery in their first 
pregnancy but only 75 percent successfully deliver their babies vaginally. However, 21 
percent of these women undergo an emergency Caesarian section delivery.  
 
Expectant women should be fully informed of the nature and risks of vaginal deliveries based 
on the information that statistics confirm that the women experience complications during 
their vaginal deliveries including tearing and haemorrhaging, where forceps are used to ease 
delivery, faecal incontinence post-delivery, and serious risks disclosing that some women 
have also experienced pelvic-prolapse.
204
  
 
A higher standard of informed consent for vaginal deliveries would be beneficial for both 
healthcare practitioner as well as the user as it reinforces the relationship of trust, it affords 
respect to the patient allowing her to be in control of her body without outside influences, and 
it can help reduce the risk of complication or the need for changes in procedure during the 
intervention, especially when the patient cannot give renewed consent for the new 
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procedure.
205
 A full disclosure reassures the user of risks and benefits and ideally, renders the 
patient fully aware of the procedures, costs, implication of unforeseen circumstances and 
suggestions of how to implement other reasonably medical alternatives when unfavorable 
outcomes arise or are identified during or post-delivery, such as birth defect.
206
 
 
A pregnant woman who visits the labor facility seeking admission may do so for the first time 
or not, but each visit requires a disclosure of the full knowledge of the intended procedures 
and its inherent risks,
207
 including the relevant information needed to choose between a 
natural delivery and a Caesarian section.  
 
Gynaecologists must be mindful of the fact that a woman in labor might not be able 
concentrate nor able to fully comprehend the sequence of events likely to happen during her 
labor process. During antenatal visits the gynaecologist ought to inform and prepare the 
expectant mothers of the labor processes. Where an emergency Caesarian section is 
warranted, the consent is sought during the delivery because the woman has not given her 
prior informed consent for the Caesarian section delivery or anesthetic procedure or any other 
related surgical procedures.
208
 
 
Essentially, informed consent must be routinely used as a means of communication 
throughout the antenatal process. This is to ensure that the patient is positively equipped to 
deal with other related problems, such as fetal heart defect, which may arise during the 
antenatal period and which can only be identified at birth or post-natal.
209
 Even a seemingly 
minute piece of information may turn out to be vitally important to the patient and her 
newborn. Thus the uniform practice of obtaining informed consent for each and every 
procedure during the childbirth process will ultimately prepare the patient to know and 
exercise their rights to their advantage.
210
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In the recent UK case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board
211
 the Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of the Appellant who sought damages against her obstetrician. Mrs. Montgomery 
alleged that Dr McLellan failed to disclose the risks of shoulder dystocia, and to obtain a 
valid informed consent despite her voicing her concerns during the pregnancy about her 
diabetes and her ability to deliver naturally. The baby was born with cerebral palsy as a result 
of the ensuing complications. While normally genetic, 6-8 percent of such cases result from 
oxygen deprivation.
212
 His shoulder got stuck in the birth canal during the delivery and he 
suffered a lack of oxygen to the brain for a period of twelve minutes. Such a tragic 
complication could have been wholly avoided if the mother was advised of the material risks. 
Two grounds of negligence were advance by the appellant’s defence team, firstly being that 
warned of the risks, the appellant could have chosen the Caesarian section route and 
prevented the child’s injury and secondly that Dr. McLellan had been negligent in failing to 
perform a caesarian section delivery after receiving the ante-natal results showing 
abnormalities in cardiotocograph traces.
213
  
 
The Montgomery case changed the law on informed consent in the UK and was a landmark 
court ruling which deviated from the ‘reasonable –doctor’ Bolam test and instead supported 
the shared decision-making model. It now obliges the healthcare practitioner to give a full 
disclosure of information, risks and options to the health user thereby respecting patient 
autonomy and self-determination in the process of obtaining informed consent.
214
  
 
Piver mentions that in the United States that the most frequently reported litigated cases filed 
against obstetricians/gynaecologists include foetal distress with brain damaged infants,  
including the high incidence of death of the fetus when women choose a natural delivery after 
previously delivering a baby via caesarian section. 
215
 
 
In the case of Lymbery v Jefferies
216
 a married woman alleged that the medical practitioner 
was negligent, in failing to inform her that the x-ray treatment she was to receive for fibrosis 
uteri could destroy her ovaries, which would render her sterile. The court held that the doctor 
was not negligent as he successfully proved that he explained to the patient that her menstrual 
periods would cease, that being a middle-aged woman, she must have understood that this 
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meant that she would not be capable of bearing children after the treatment.
217
 Some women 
are able to bear children up until menopause and there is little or no justification for a doctor 
to assume that a middle aged woman will not want to reproduce further nor should they 
believe that their patients are aware of the consequences of the treatment being administered 
without it being fully explained to them. This is the very essence of the doctrine of informed 
consent. 
 
In Richter v Estate Hammann
218
 the court held that there was no obligation on the doctor to 
meticulously inform the patient of each and every possible adverse consequence and 
complication of the treatment but that all-significant and usual risks should be disclosed. The 
test should be one of the reasonable-doctor of that particular position faced with the same 
problem and whether or not the risks involved in the proposed intervention are material 
risks.
219
  
In the case of Castell v De Greef,
220
 the court shifted away from the “reasonable doctor 
standard” and applied the “patient-centered,” subjective test in examining the right to the 
patient’s informed consent, highlighting the issue of doctors failing to fully disclose all 
material information and the risks to which a reasonable person would attach significance to 
and led to the finding that informed consent was lacking in this case. 
The case dealt with an unsuccessful prophylactic double mastectomy and breast reduction 
conducted by the doctor to minimize the risk of breast cancer. The court held again, that the 
doctor was not obliged to meticulously explain to the patient each and every complication that 
may arise, but only those of material risk inherent in the proposed treatment. A risk was 
clarified as being ‘… a material risk if, in the circumstances of a particular case: (a) a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it; or (b) the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.’221 
 
This decision has significant value in affording a woman the opportunity to exercise her 
constitutional rights to bodily and psychological integrity, most especially, her rights to 
choices concerning reproduction and sexual health.
222
 To enable women to make informed 
choices and decisions, they need to be educated and informed of basic biology, of the nature, 
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risks and expected outcomes of medical interventions and the positive value in undertaking 
medical strategies proposed by the doctor.  It is especially pertinent to those pregnant women 
who are HIV positive, or those HIV positive women who wish to become pregnant, to be 
informed of vital health information like the risk of mother to child transmission of HIV; the 
available options to reduce the risk of this transmission using antiretroviral drugs, formula 
feeding and delivery by caesarian section; that pregnancy and childbirth may negatively 
impact on her current health status, that the prognosis of a child born with HIV is poor and 
that their expected lifespan is only two years.
223
 
 
 
Christa van Wyk
224
 discusses that depending on a women’s circumstances, a failure to inform 
a pregnant woman of her HIV status, together with its associated risks and childbirth will 
‘deprive her of her right to make informed decisions regarding sterilization, contraception, 
conception, abortion, the use of antiretroviral drugs during childbirth to prevent infection, and 
breastfeeding.’225 Informed consent must obtained for the HIV testing and must part of pre-
testing counseling.  
 
Coetzee
226
 asserts that in the Castell case, that Ackerman J strongly rejected the notion that 
fear on the part of the doctor in believing that a patient will forego medically indicated 
intervention if informed of the risks involved, justifies withholding that information.
227
 As a 
result doctors could be liable for assault where their failure to obtain informed consent is 
motivated by such fear. A medical practitioner is obliged to warn about material risks, to be 
comprehensive in disclosure, not necessarily to all remote or unusual risks, but to all 
reasonably foreseeable risks throughout the entire treatment.
228
  
 
For a patient to have given “informed consent” to a medical treatment, intervention or 
procedure, the patient must: 
(1) have knowledge of the nature and extent of the harm or risk involved in the 
 procedure 
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(2) have an appreciation and understanding of the nature of the harm or risk; 
(3)  have consented to the harm or assumed risk; and 
(4) have provided a consent that demonstrates comprehension and that extends to  
             the entire treatment, including its consequences.
229
   
the court adopted the patient- centred approach as in Castell v de Greef, where it was 
argued that the defendant should have explained the likelihood of “claudication 
occurring as a result of a iliac bi-femoral bypass.”230 The doctor was found guilty of 
medical negligence.
231
 
 
 
In the case of Oldwage v Lowrens, a vascular surgeon performed an operation on the plaintiff, 
following consultation and complaints of intense pain in his right leg caused by poor blood 
supply to the leg. An angiogram test revealed that many of the plaintiff’s arteries were 
occluded. An urgent iliac bi-femoral operation was performed on the plaintiff, who suffered a 
post-surgical complication of claudication of his left leg and thereafter sued the defendant for 
medical negligence.
232
 
 
The doctor then decided to take matter on appeal. The Appeal court had to determine whether 
the doctor had acted as a reasonable vascular surgeon should, if faced with the same 
circumstances and would have misdiagnosed the patient’s problem as being primarily 
vascular in nature rather than neuralgic back pain. The Appeal court dealt with two other 
main issues: (a) that of informed consent for surgical procedure and whether or not the 
absence of such consent amounted to assault on the patient; and (b) whether or not the 
doctor’s surgical intervention caused the plaintiff’s claudication in his left leg? The court 
accepted reasons advanced by experts showing that there was only a two percent chance of 
“sub clavian steal syndrome ”233 occurring. The risk to the plaintiff was so negligible that it 
was not unreasonable for the defendant to have failed to mention it.
234
 The court applied the 
standard of the reasonable doctor faced with a particular problem as adopted in the case of 
Richter and Another v Estate Hammann.
235
 The court was guided by the professional 
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standards of disclosure and medical opinion regarding what a reasonable doctor ought to do, 
having regard to all the circumstances in a particular case.
236
 
 
It was held that the risk to the plaintiff was so negligible that it was not unreasonable or 
negligent for the defendant to not have discussed it.
237
 The court upheld the appeal and held 
that an absence of informed consent was not proven and that the claudication was not caused 
by the doctor’s surgical intervention.238 
 
In the case of McDonald v Wroe,
239
 the court held that a plaintiff who intends to rely on lack 
of informed consent bears the onus of proving that on a balance of probabilities the medical 
practitioner was negligent in failing to properly warn the patient of the particular risks of a 
particular procedure, and that this omission was a direct cause of the patient’s damages 
suffered.
240
 
 
The facts of the case involved the non-disclosure of the seriousness of the procedure of dental 
extractions of the plaintiff’s wisdom teeth and possible nerve damage as a material risk of the 
procedure. The plaintiff had suffered a series of repeated infections in the area of her wisdom 
teeth and the defendant had correctly advised her to remove these wisdom teeth under general 
anesthesia. After surgery, the plaintiff experienced numbness on the left side of her face, a 
result of her “inferior alveolar nerve” being permanently damaged.241 
 
In Esterhuizen v Administration Transvaal
242
 case where the plaintiff was subject to X-ray 
treatment without the proper informed consent being obtained, the court held that consent for 
X-ray treatment, in the belief that it was harmless or ignorant of the material risks it carries, 
cannot amount to effective consent to undergo the risks and consequent harm. The court 
further held the doctors and hospital staff were negligent in that they ought to have fully 
disclosed to the patient the procedure, its risks, possible disfigurement, cosmetic changes and 
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where the employment of a particular technique may result in severe irradiation of the tissue 
to the extent that it might cause ‘death of the tissue’ and the risk of amputation. The servants 
of the defendant had no right to subject the patient to that particular x-ray treatment without 
her consent.
243
 
 
These cases, read in combination, should show the history of jurisprudence surrounding what 
is deemed to be adequate information to achieve informed consent. Clearly, while a doctor 
cannot be held responsible for the most unlikely and unforeseeable event, they are responsible 
for informing the patient of all reasonably likely and relevant possible outcome/s or side 
effect/s of the suggested intervention/s. 
 
In a recent case of Pane v MEC Free State
244
 the court held that patients have a dual 
responsibility of proving negligence against the offending doctor or health care practitioner in 
addition to proving failure to obtain valid informed consent. Mrs. Pane instituted legal action 
against the MEC for the Department of Health in Free State and initially claimed that the 
employees of the defendant were negligent by cutting her intestine and removing her womb. 
Mrs. Pane then amended her particulars of claim to fully outline the stages of her medical 
procedures leading the stage where her whole uterus was removed and a colostomy bag was 
inserted. Mrs. Pane denied that she consented to the removal of her whole womb and stated 
that she only agreed to explorative laparoscopy. She further maintained that the benefits 
material risks and consequences of the procedures were not explained to her. The doctor 
testified that Mrs. Pane’s condition was critical; she was taken to the operating theatre and the 
only available lifesaving option was an abdominal hysterectomy. Seeing that the severity of 
the condition was discovered when the patient was under anesthetic, the surgeons, acted in the 
patient’s best interest of the patient and obtained consent was from the hospital’s 
superintendent to perform the lifesaving procedure. 
245
 
 
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the grounds that she was unable to allege and 
prove the negligence, which is a requirement for delictual liability, on the offending doctors 
or medical health professional on a balance of probabilities.
246
  
 
But these violations of consent or autonomy are not going to be tolerated by an increasingly 
informed public for much longer. Currently, with the increase in women attaining higher 
educational qualifications and skills, and where woman are better informed via the media and 
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other sources about health matters there is raised expectation of the quality of medical 
services and treatment.
247
 With a full disclosure of the relevant knowledge regarding one’s 
medical treatment and interventions, the patient is in a better position to improve their 
medical status by making informed choices. When a health care practitioner engages in 
“truth-telling,” communication of his knowledge, advice and guidance, and shows respect for 
autonomy, self-determination, it reinforces trust in the relationship, minimizes disappointment 
and more especially, litigation when the medical intervention has an undesirable outcome.
248
 
This ‘truth telling” rapport created by morally sound medical practice, allows for freely 
voiced opinions or concerns in circumstances where the patient has felt short-changed or 
where their expectations were unmet.
249
 
 
The medical professional rules of the HPCSA as well as the World Medical Association 
clearly stipulate that graduating doctors entering the medical arena are bound by an obligation 
to ensure that their patients’ health is treated with paramount importance. 250  But this 
obligation competes against a profit motive.
251
 Their actions ‘must be in the best interest of 
the patients’252 and medical professionals are expected to ‘maintain the highest standard of 
integrity.’253 This makes it mandatory for doctors to place the health interests of their patients 
before payment or any other matters or personal gain.  
 
2.4. Emergency medical treatment 
 
In medical emergencies, health practitioners are ethically, statutorily
254
 and constitutionally
255
 
bound to provide treatment to prevent imminent harm. Where the patient is unable to give 
consent or has not actively refused treatment in a crisis, then the health care professional can 
proceed to administer the life-saving treatment without delay.
256
 Once the critical period of 
danger has passed, the doctor can refer the patient to a suitable health facility or provider for 
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further treatment with a covering letter.
257
 A doctor cannot abandon a patient who cannot pay 
in advance for treatment without making alternate arrangements for the patient.
258
 And in the 
event that there are no qualified medical personal available, and an emergency arises, any 
person may offer first aid assistance to stabilize them and ensure that they make it to the 
hospital to be treated professionally.
259
 
 
A standout example of disregard for health care and human rights laws in South Africa, is a 
case that occurred on the 12
th
 March 2015 where a pregnant woman was denied any 
assistance by nurses from the Alexandra Clinic because she had previously registered for 
medical treatment at the Edenvale General Hospital. The woman was forced to give birth on 
the pavement outside Alexandra Clinic despite her plea for emergency medical assistance.
260
 
 
In terms of section 27 (3) of the Constitution, there is a statutory obligation on the medical 
practitioner, practicing in a public or private setting, to act positively and administer 
emergency medical treatment, unless the medical practitioner has sound and compelling 
reasons to refuse such.
261
 
 
In the matter of Soobramoney vs Minister of Health (Kwa Zulu Natal)
262
 the appellant sought 
to claim his right to emergency medical treatment under section 27 (3) of the Constitution. 
The appellant believed that his medical circumstances entitled him to receive renal dialysis 
treatment at a state hospital. Justice Chaskalson P, analyzed the provisions of section 27 of 
the Constitution together with the obligations of the state under these provisions and 
concluded that the appellant’s claim must fail on the grounds that section 27 (3) envisages a 
sudden dramatic event or occurrence which in terms of time, is of a passing nature.
263
 The 
court held that this claim for treatment did not fall under the concept of ‘emergency medical 
treatment’ as contained in section 27 (3) instead the claim must be considered in terms of 
section 27 (1) and section 27 (2) which entitles everyone to have access to health care 
services provided by the state, all within the ‘available resources’.264 He further stated that the 
concept of  ‘emergency medical treatment’ incorporates the element of suddenness or 
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unexpectedness and the right described in section 27 (3) ensures that treatment be given in an 
emergency or accident or in an unforeseeable catastrophe.
265
 
 
In July 2015, The KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health investigated the death of a young 
man, which resulted from the refusal of emergency medical services at two government 
hospitals.
266
 It was reported that a critically injured man was refused treatment first by one 
hospital, and then shockingly, at a second. The patient succumbed to his injuries whilst 
awaiting emergency medical treatment.
267
 
 
The report included these comments made by the responding paramedics:  
‘… critically injured people are supposed to be transported to the nearest hospital to be 
stabilized, before being transferred to an alternate hospital. However in most cases the patient 
is refused any treatment leaving paramedics to either wait on scene for an accepting hospital 
or drive to the next hospital with the hope of staff assisting.’268 
 
He then went on to say: 
‘… far too many poor people are being turned away from government hospitals and are 
succumbing to their injuries due to hospital staff and doctors finding excuses not to treat 
dying patients.’269 
 
Sam Mkhwanazi, the spokesperson for the Kwa Zulu-Natal Department of Health re-affirmed 
the Department’s policy that the patient must be transported to the nearest health facility to be 
stabilized, irrespective of whether or not it fell into the public or private sector.
270
 This 
satisfies the statutory duty in Section 5 of The National Health Act, which provides that: ‘A 
health care provider, health worker or health establishment may not refuse a person 
emergency medical treatment.’271  
 
Section 7 of the National Health Act provides that consent may be dispensed with, including 
situations in a medical emergency and where: ‘any delay in the provision of the health service 
to the user might result in his or her death or irreversible damage to his or her health and 
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where the user has not expressly, impliedly or by conduct refused that service;
272
 where the 
user is unable to give consent and has given a mandate to another person to give consent on 
their behalf;
273
 authorized consent is granted by court order or in terms of any law
274
 and a 
failure to treat the user or group of people including the user will result in a serious risk to 
public health.’275 
 
McQuoid-Mason
276
 discusses section 27(3) of the Constitution as well as section 7 of the 
National Health Act, asserting that this provision should apply to legally competent patients 
who have been rendered incompetent to give consent (e.g. because they are unconscious), and 
require emergency medical treatment.
277
 An example of this would be where a husband or 
wife has become unconscious and there is no time to contact the spouse or next-of-kin, as 
required by the act before beginning the life-saving procedure or intervention to prevent death 
or irreversible damage to the health of the patient.
278
 
 
In a medical emergency, once a patient has been assessed and primary life saving procedures 
have been administered, the doctor is permitted to perform the other secondary procedure/s 
without the patient’s express consent unless it has been refused in advance.279  
An example of advanced refusal/s can be found in patients who have been attended to or been 
treated by the gynaecologist over a period of time during her pregnancy and had during her 
antenatal consultations authorized and recorded certain treatments she was willing to undergo 
in the unlikely event of an emergency.   In certain situations, should the doctor perform such 
operation without consent it will constitute an assault on the person and an infringement of 
the patient’s bodily integrity. 280Where the patient has not delegated the duty to consent to 
anyone nor is he or she able to give consent, then consent can be sought from a spouse or 
partner, parent, grandparent, major child, brother or sister.
281
 
 
‘Therapeutic necessity’ is based on the doctrine of implied consent, and is a defense used in 
instances where a medical professional administers a priority medical intervention in an 
emergency situation and is then sued for not properly acquiring informed consent.
282
 A 
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medical practitioner who relies properly on a therapeutic necessity defense argues that they 
have acted to protect the patient’s (or that of another person) legally protected interest, which 
was already endangered by a threat of harm, and that that onset of that harm had commenced, 
was imminent and could not be averted in any safe way that also preserved their informed 
consent.
283
 
 
 
2.5. A closer examination of Informed consent in relation to the termination of 
 pregnancy and forced sterilization. 
 
The Namibian case of LM and Others v Government of the Republic of Namibia,
284
 dealt with 
informed consent with respect to three HIV positive women who were subject to forced 
sterilization in the public hospitals in Namibia, in the hope of preventing the infection of 
newborn children. Here, the court held that a written consent form did not suffice as informed 
consent. Instead women undergoing a sterilization procedure needed proper counseling in 
their own language, pitched to a level of their understanding, as well as advancing alternate 
options to methods of contraception.
285
 The court case of LM and Others
286
 held that in 
addition to the knowledge of the nature and effect of the act being consented to, the health 
care practitioner is required to make notes and document the actual information given to the 
patient ensuring that the patient was given sufficient information to make an informed 
decision. 
287
 With regard to a woman’s reproductive rights and bodily integrity, the Court also 
held that obtaining consent during the painful labor process did not promote voluntariness to 
consent; these women cannot rationally comprehend the consequences of giving consent to 
the sterilization procedure and their right to autonomous decision-making is diminished. 
288
 
The Namibian Government appealed to Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the 
High Court.
289
 The Supreme Court held that the respondent women did not provide sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that they were sterilized based on their HIV- positive status.
290
 After 
testimony from the three women and two expert witnesses, the court held that the respondents 
proved that informed consent required for the sterilization procedure was absent.
291
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The court held that health care practitioners have an obligation to obtain consent from the 
patient: 
 ‘sterilization allows time for informed and considered decisions…health 
 professionals are under an obligation to assess the patient and point out the risks 
 involved in particular procedures so as to enable the patient to make an informed 
 decision and give her consent.’292 
The court further rejected medical paternalism and viewed it as harmful to patients.
293
 
  
The South African case of Isaac v Pandie,
294
 highlights a breach of statutory duties by an 
obstetrician, as well as the need for the patient to reflect on and understand the sterilization 
procedure for there to be informed consent.
295
 The court had to establish whether or not the 
sterilization procedure conducted on the plaintiff was justified by the requisite informed 
consent. The court found that informed consent was absent and the doctor’s treatment was 
wrongful because consent satisfying the grounds of justification of the sterilization procedure 
was not obtained. The plaintiff’s rights to bodily and psychological integrity in terms Section 
12 of the Constitution had been violated. It was held further that the forced sterilization 
violated the patient’s rights to privacy, dignity, reputation and safety.296 
In the Isaacs case, the plaintiff was admitted to Christiaan Barnard Memorial Hospital in 
Cape Town where the defendant performed a Caesarian and a sterilization procedure on her. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant did not have her full and informed consent to perform 
the sterilization procedure and the sterilization constituted an assault.  
The plaintiff said that she was ‘guided by the doctor’ at the time to have a Caesarian section 
and there was no discussions regarding sterilizations at all. Only, during the last three 
antenatal visits, did the defendant discuss sterilization, and in all pre-natal consultations, the 
plaintiff had rejected and refused to be sterilized. 
 
The plaintiff maintained that the defendant had performed the sterilization contrary to her 
consent and express wishes. The defendant was found ‘to have breached his duty of care to 
the patient; he failed to check the consent form and verify that the patient wanted the 
sterilization procedure in line with the provisions of Section 4 of the Sterilization Act 
whereby he failed to inform the patient of the procedure in advance.
297
 It was held that the 
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obstetrician acted wrongfully, negligently in breach of his legal and professional duty in 
performing the sterilization procedure’298 and which constituted an assault. The court held 
further that the defendant’s actions were an invasion of the plaintiff’s right to privacy, dignity, 
reputation and safety
299
 as there was no clinical indication, which warranted the sterilization 
procedure. Leave to appeal the decision was granted. Mrs. Isaac stated that on admission to 
hospital she was presented with a pre-drafted consent form based on her doctor’s referral for a 
caesarian section and a sterilization procedure. She refused to sign the consent form; she 
agreed a caesarian section only and not a sterilization procedure. The court held that both in 
terms of common law and in terms of the Sterilization Act
300
 written consent is required for 
the sterilization procedure. Further, the patient has the right to retract her consent to 
sterilization anytime prior to the procedure in terms of both common law and Sterilization 
Act.
301
 It was further held that it was the duty of the nurse to advise the doctor of the patient’s 
retraction of the consent to the procedure; also that it was not a common practice for surgeons 
to personally inspect the consent forms prior to the medical procedure/s.
302
  
 
This finding can be criticized that although medical practitioners are duty bound to obtain 
consent in both common law and in terms of the Sterilization Act
303
, the Act is silent on 
whom the legal obligation rests for obtaining informed consent however the ethical HPCSA 
guidelines require that the surgeon is ultimately responsible for obtaining consent.
304
 The 
surgeon, when sued, would rely on the defence of volenti non fit injuria and it will be difficult 
to prove all elements of the defence if his delegate obtained the informed consent.  
 
I firmly disagree with the court ‘s approach where it had based its findings on the expert 
evidence advanced and suggested that it was an accepted practice for the nurse instead of the 
surgeon who was responsible for obtaining the necessary consent. I firmly believe that the 
court erred by placing liability on the nurse instead of the surgeon as this approach does not 
conform with the guidelines as set out by the HPCSA
305
 which states that there is an express 
duty on the surgeon to obtain and document the consent before a sterilization procedure and 
clearly not the obligation of the nurse to ensure that consent is properly obtained.
306
 
                                                                                                                                           
risks and the reversible or irreversible nature of the sterilization procedure; (b) been given advice that the consent 
may be withdrawn any time before the treatment; and (c) understood and signed the prescribed consent form.’  
298 Isaacs v Pandie supra 197 
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300
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The court in the case of Jansen van Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger
307
 dealt with an HIV 
positive patient’s rights to confidentiality and held that the patient has the right to expect that 
their doctor complies with their ethical and professional guidelines.  
 
The full bench of the Western Cape High Court in the unreported judgment of Pandie v 
Isaac
308
 heard counsel’s argument for the plaintiff which primary focused on the performance 
of the procedure in the absence of a consent which was negligent in the circumstances and 
had not focused on the allegations that the performance of the sterilization procedure, without 
the patient’s consent, constituted an assault. The court had to determine whether there was a 
complete absence of consent and not whether there was an absence of informed consent. 
Rogers J held that the use of the word” assault” in the medical setting was unnecessary and 
would lead to confusion.
309
 Rogers J stated the following in respect to informed consent: 
 
 ‘But the word  ‘assault’ is also misleading where it is used in a medical setting to 
 denote merely that the doctor administered treatment without informed consent, 
 because such conduct, even though it is wrongful, does not without more give rise to 
 liability and would rarely be perpetrated with dolus- it might not even be negligent.’ 
 
I am of the opinion that this finding is flawed seeing that the court did not consider dolus-
eventualis and it also differs from that of Jansen van Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger in a 
sense that the court did not find that the surgeon’s conduct was wrongful by not complying 
with the ethical guidelines in personally obtaining the informed consent. HPCSA guidelines 
regulates that surgeons are duty bound to obtain informed consent.
310
 
 
In the case of Sibisi NO v Maitin
311
 Mrs Sibisi sued Dr. Maitin for damages suffered by her 
daughter as a direct result of the negligent conduct of Dr Maitin during the delivery process.  
The baby’s right shoulder suffered nerve injury, resulting in paralysis of the right arm. The 
High Court dismissed the action and granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
On Appeal Mrs. Sibisi alleged that informed consent was absent primarily because the doctor 
had failed to fully disclose the inherent risks of a vaginal delivery given her actual weight and 
the estimated size of the baby; that he was under a duty to warn her prior to inducing labor of 
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the ‘material risks and complications which might flow’ and to offer her alternate options, 
like a C- section, which she would have chosen as a child birth option, to minimize the 
risks.
312
 However, Mrs. Sibisi did not advance any argument to convince the court that if she 
had known of the risks associated with vaginal delivery, she would have opted for C-section. 
The court held: 
 
 ‘ No evidence was lead to show what the reasonable patient in Mrs. Sibisi’s position 
    would have done had she been warned of the risk of shoulder dystocia ( a risk that 
    was lower than one percent), and advised about the choice between a vaginal  
    delivery or a C – section. Would she have taken the far greater risk attendant on a 
    C- section or the very minor risk of shoulder dystocia occurring? We do not     
     know.’313 
 
The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that Mrs Sibisi failed to prove that Dr. Maitin was 
negligent nor his conduct wrongful; that there was no need to establish which standard of 
disclosure should apply with regard to informed consent matters, thereby failing to extend the 
common law as enshrined in our Constitution.
314
  The court found that ‘there was no need to 
develop the common law in order to recognize a patient’s autonomy and right to bodily 
integrity in making an informed decision as to whether to proceed with one course of action 
rather than the other’.315  It was held that ‘the question of informed consent goes to the 
wrongfulness element of the Aquilian action’316; the negligent conduct on the part of Dr. 
Maitin will be wrongful if the patient has not given informed consent, however seeing that 
negligence had not been established, there was no need to consider wrongfulness or grounds 
excluding wrongfulness.
317
 
 
The HPCSA guidelines clearly state that healthcare practitioners are obliged to discuss the 
possibilities of problems arising out of the intended procedures and must obtain consent to 
treat any problems that should arise in the midst of the operation and when the patient is in 
the state of unconsciousness. This will give the patient an opportunity to consider all available 
options in advance and then authorize the doctor to proceed to treat additional problems.
318
 If 
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followed, it would also have prevented a case such as the one just discussed from ever 
happening. 
 
India presents far more extreme challenges to the ethics of sterilization and informed consent. 
Studies regarding female sterilization in the Uttar Pradesh State of India indicated an 
unacceptable and poor quality of care of women
319
 highlight how inadequate procedures 
relating to informed consent are handled, resulting in morbidity and mortality arising from 
these appalling conditions under which females are sterilized.
320
 
 
This changing healthcare needs of the population as well as the increasing population in India 
is placing enormous demands on the health system and visits to the Indian sterilization 
campsites where these women stayed revealed that women were made to sign the consent 
forms or place their thumb impression on the form without proper consultation and 
information given to them.
321
 No explanation of the procedure was given which was a basic 
requirement of medical practice and as outlined in the Standards Manual
322
 issued by the 
Government of India. The study concluded that the manner in which sterilization camps in 
Uttar Pradesh were conducted, gave rise to a large number of legal issues, based on a clear 
violation of the Guidelines as set out in the Standards of Male and Female document
323
 as 
well as in terms of section 90 of the Indian Penal Code
324
 relating to informed consent.
325
 
 
2.6. Therapeutic privilege 
 
The concept of therapeutic privilege is a recognized exception to informed consent in modern 
medical practice.
326
 It allows a healthcare practitioner, in exceptional circumstances to use a 
communication strategy during the consent stage to disclose only what the medical 
professional deems necessary at that moment
327
 and to ultimately protect the patient from the 
                                                                                                                                           
prefer to give further thought to before they proceed. Health care practitioners must abide by patient’s decisions on 
these issues. If in exceptional circumstances health care practitioners decide, while the patient is unconscious, to 
treat a condition, which falls, outside the scope of the patient’s consent, their decision may be challenged in the 
courts, or be the subject of a complaint to their employers or the HPSCA. Health care practitioners should 
therefore seek the views of an experienced colleague, wherever possible, before providing the treatment. They 
must be prepared to explain and justify their decisions based on such consideration as preservation of life. Health 
care practitioners must tell the patient what they have done and why, as soon as the patient is sufficiently 
recovered to understand.’  
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truth.
328
 Therapeutic privilege is a paternalistic approach whereby ‘doctor knows best’ comes 
into play, and the act of withholding of information from the patient places them in a position 
of authority.
329
 The patient should be deemed to be the best person to judge his own interests. 
The doctor is seen to deliberately lie or omit the full disclosure of information of the intended 
procedures and its inherent risks with the primarily aim being to protect the patient from, for 
example, possible psychological harmful effects of the normal full disclosure.
330
 
 
Therapeutic privilege is an exception to informed consent as seen in the National Health 
Act.
331
 In terms of Section 6(1)(a) of the NHA the health care provider is permitted to 
withhold information from the patient: “in circumstances where there is substantial evidence 
that the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the best interest” the 
patient.
332
 The patient must be able to participate in the decision-making process as stipulated 
in Section 8(1) of the NHA, and any administration of medical treatment without the patient’s 
consent is considered unlawful or wrongful.
333
 Furthermore the provisions of section 8(3) of 
the National Health Act stipulates that if the patient is unable to participate in the decision 
making processes regarding his health and future medical treatment, they should be informed 
after the administration or provision of the health service unless the disclosure will be 
contrary to the user’s best interest.334  
 
The defense of therapeutic privilege is seen as a suitable remedy or ground for justification, 
by health practitioners who believe that the withholding of vital information from the patient, 
and the unauthorized administration of medical treatment and/or intervention serves the best 
interest and welfare of a competent patient.
335
 Informed consent on the other hand, empowers 
the patient to make individual life choices regarding his or her treatment, shows respect for 
the patient and promotes the patient’s wellbeing.336 
 
In South Africa the medical practitioner and/or the medical facility can be held liable for 
assault if consent is absent, irrespective of the success of the procedure or professional skill 
and care of the attending medical professional. The health care provider cannot deny the user 
his or her constitutional rights to autonomy and self–determination337  and the successful 
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outcome of the intervention cannot be used as a defense for providing it improperly. On the 
other hand, a poor outcome of the intervention can be used by the plaintiff to claim damages.  
 
Healthcare providers should be mindful that our legal system has mandatory requirements, to 
which they are legally bound. The law requires that the patient give their consent freely and 
voluntarily with full knowledge of the risks, extent of the harm and consequences of the 
treatment to which they are subjecting themselves. Section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution
338
 
protects the persons’ right of physical bodily integrity as was held in the case of Bester v 
Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk.
339
 This case recognizes that the 
right encompasses a person’s psyche as well as their physical being.340 
 
Some practitioners rely on therapeutic privilege as a defense and justify their conduct by 
asserting that they anticipate that a full disclosure of information relating to the medical 
procedure, treatment or operation would have a harmful effect on the patient’s emotional and 
psychological well-being. Doctors claim to use the principle of beneficence by withholding 
information to ultimately ensure a patient’s wellbeing.341  
 
In order for a medical practitioner to succeed in a defense of therapeutic privilege, he or she 
needs to satisfy three elements as suggested by Morton, namely:  
1. “the facts and circumstance must justify the use of privilege; 
2. the physician must be satisfied that full disclosure will have a significant effect on 
the patient; and 
3. the exercise of the discretion must be reasonable under the circumstances.”342 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
is a ‘ bizarre implication of such a notion that, where the risk does not eventuate and the intervention is successful, 
the doctor’s conduct should still be regarded as an assault.’ 
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Van Oosten submits that therapeutic privilege gives a physician a unique discretion to forego 
disclosure, which negates his or her professional duty and legal obligation to disclose 
information.
343
 In such cases the physician must strike a balance between information 
disclosure, alleviating undue emotional and psychological stress on the patient to enable a 
desirable outcome, whilst protecting patient autonomy and his/her medical choices.
344
 
 
 
In light of the current laws, which promote patient autonomy, self-determination and bodily 
security,
345
 there is little room for therapeutic privilege as it undermines the value of informed 
consent.
346
 Doctors have chosen to adopt ‘… a more realistic, common sense approach’ in 
assessing psychological profiles of their patients to establish whether or not a full disclosure 
of their diagnosis and medical intervention may discourage them from undergoing the 
proposed treatment.
347
 
 
In Tatro v Leuken, Kan
348
 non-disclosure of the ‘risk of vesico-vaginal fistula associated with 
a hysterectomy’ was accepted because the doctor explained that a full disclosure would have 
resulted in frightening the patient prior to surgery and she ‘might have died or developed 
serious complications.’ The result would have negatively affected the patient’s emotional 
wellbeing.
349
The court held in favour of therapeutic privilege allowing the physician to 
withhold information from a patient in circumstances where a complete disclosure of the risks 
would endanger his or her physical or mental condition.
350
 
 
In a more recent case of Teik Huat Tai v Saxon
351
 the court rejected the obstetrician’s defence 
of protecting the patient from further depression and found the doctor negligent in failing to 
advise the patient of the risks of recto-vaginal fistula following a hysterectomy and vaginal 
damage. The court held that the woman if informed and warned of the risks, she would have 
not undergone the operation.
352
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Medical practitioners take a risk and violate the patient’s constitutional rights by adopting 
therapeutic privilege in the treatment process. Apart from the fact that patients are unable to 
benefit from their right to a full disclosure in making a decision, the patients can, and is likely 
at some point, to lose trust and faith in their doctors, which will irreparably undermine the 
doctor-patient relationship.
353
 On the other hand, some argue that lying to a patient may be a 
route to promoting patient autonomy rather than inhibiting it.
354
 Arguments positively 
advanced against therapeutic privilege focus on promoting autonomy and self- determination 
and is based on a physician’s legal obligation to obtain informed consent.355  
 
Van den Heever
356
 discusses therapeutic privilege as a justifiable and ‘medically warranted’ 
act of withholding information from their patients to prevent them from becoming so ill and 
emotionally and psychologically distraught that will cause them to hinder or forego 
treatment.
357
 
 
The case of Canterbury v Spence
358
 is an American authority rejecting the idea that medical 
professionals should withhold information on the basis that disclosure would prevent patients 
from undergoing treatment or therapy on the basis that this approach is paternalistic and does 
not afford the patient the benefit of self-determination.
359
 Justice Robinson CJ stated: ‘True 
consent to what happens to one’s life is the informed exercise of choice, and that entails an 
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available.’360 
 
 The American Medical Association states that ‘withholding medical information from 
patients without their knowledge or consent is ethically unacceptable.’361 Physicians should 
adopt some degree of empathy when communicating medical information to their patients.
362
 
The manner of communication and the timing of imparting medical information by the 
physician to the patient play a pivotal role in influencing the patient’s decision. 363 
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In the case of Rogers v Whitaker
364
 the court held that the ophthalmic surgeon had a duty to 
disclose to the patient, who was nearly blind at the time of consultation, that there are material 
risks involved in the proposed operation. In this case, the surgeon advised the patient that an 
operation to the almost blind left-eye would restore her sight. Unfortunately for the patient, 
there was no improvement post–operatively and she developed an inflammation in her left 
eye, which rendered her blind. The patient then sued the ophthalmic surgeon for negligence in 
failing to fully disclose the material risk of developing sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye 
as a result of the operation.
365
 
 
Coetzee
366
 further criticizes ‘therapeutic privilege’ stating that the majority of the judges in 
Rogers v Whitaker did not accept the idea of therapeutic privilege as advanced by Molnar. He 
opines that Molnar favours the use of therapeutic privilege and supports the idea primarily on 
the belief that if medical practitioners disclose to their patients, all complications and risks 
attached to an operation, no patient would ever have an operation. Furthermore, under 
Molnar’s philosophy, where surgery is warranted, a medical practitioner may deliberately 
withhold information from the patient to avoid anxiety and distress and ensure that they 
undertake the procedure. Sometimes therapeutic privilege can be used to manipulate patients 
into granting consent for the benefit of a doctor’s financial gain or in the interest of 
experiments.
367
 
 
The results of a study by Lankton et al
368
 on gyneacological patients, testing their emotional 
responses towards detailed disclosure showed ‘that there was no increased apprehension nor 
refusal to undergo surgery in those patients who received detailed information.’369  
 
Van den Heever suggests that the doctors must make a clinical assessment of the patient’s 
psychological state, evaluate the patient’s level of understanding and take cognizance of their 
reactions to the information conveyed to him or her.
370
 The doctor using the defence of 
therapeutic privilege bears the onus of justifying the material non-disclosure.
371
 The courts 
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have on occasion accepted a doctor’s explanation for adopting non-disclosure as part of the 
treatment process to reduce the risk of emotional distress and anxiety.
372
  
 
The court in the case of Chappel v Hart
373
 dealt with use of therapeutic privilege to withhold 
information that would harm rather than benefit the patient. The plaintiff alleged that the 
surgeon had failed in his duty to disclose material risks and therefore prejudiced her from 
seeking a second opinion or the opportunity to engage a more senior surgeon.
374
 The court 
held the surgeon was required to warn the patient of risks of the medical procedure, further 
strengthening the jurisprudence respecting patient autonomy and self-determination.
375
 
 
 
In the case of Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlehem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital,
376
 a surgeon used a defense of therapeutic privilege when the plaintiff alleged that 
the he had failed to disclose the risks of the operation. The court held that the surgeon could 
escape liability for failing to disclose the inherent risks and substantiated his defence of 
therapeutic privilege by demonstrating to the court that a full disclosure of the risks would 
have a detrimental impact to the patient’s health, including the patient’s mental health.377 
 
This case dealt with a man in his thirties who experienced pain in his left eye and was treated 
by an ophthalmologist. The plaintiff alleged that the failure to inform him regarding the 
nature of the disease in his eye, together with the results of the histological examinations, and 
the lack of full explanation of his prognosis, contributed to his medical deterioration into 
metastasis. This seriously affected the health condition of his right eye, which rendered him 
unfit to work. The plaintiff claimed material and immaterial damages.
378
 The court held that 
the omission to inform a patient of the seriousness of his condition as well as the urgency to 
obtain further medical examinations constituted a gross violation of medical standards. The 
court found that the ophthalmologist could not escape liability for the deterioration in the 
plaintiff’s medical condition, as he was directly responsible for not fully disclosing the cancer 
diagnosis and the consequences that were to follow.
379
 
 
The ophthalmologist argued that based on his assessment of the plaintiff’s psychological 
instability and his belief that the patient would be unable to cope with the diagnosis, he chose 
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not to disclose the results to the patient directly but to rather inform the patient’s wife and 
father.
380
 The court rejected this argument as being unfounded. The court held that the duty to 
treat correlates directly with the duty to inform, and thus found no justification in the 
ophthalmologist’s actions placing the responsibility to disclose, to make important urgent 
medical decisions on behalf of the patient or to encourage the patient to take further tests on 
the patient’s next of kin.381 
 
Therapeutic privilege has had few victories in recent years. It is difficult to conceive of 
common circumstances in which the protection of patient interests could overcome the 
constitutional duty to informed consent. Perhaps in cases of limited capacity, but the case law 
has been such that very little room remains in South African medical practice for withholding 
critical health care information from the patient. In instances where the medical professional 
believes that the patient will be at risk of psychological harm and anxiety by receiving 
unfavourable medical information, it is advisable to initially send the patient for a medical 
assessment and intervention prior to using the therapeutic privilege. Doctors can use the 
results of the assessment to gauge the patient’s level of anxiety, fear, depression and denial of 
the medical condition. A doctor should be equipped to convey and communicate the patient’s 
diagnosis, risks, remedies, prognosis and will be successful in obtaining informed consent. An 
active stance towards enforcing proper medical training and communication skills for all 
medical professionals at tertiary levels will positively benefit the move in the right direction 
towards attaining informed consent ensuring the reduction of the high incidence of medical 
negligence cases.
382
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CHAPTER 3: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING 
INFORMED CONSENT 
 
The doctrine of informed consent is widely recognized in both national and international legal 
systems. Informed consent is an important ethical consideration that needs to be view in the 
context of socio-economical status, the political impact, cultural beliefs, traditions, the quality 
of life and the extent of wellbeing of individual people in industrialized countries like India, 
Canada, England, Australia and South Africa comply with informed consent; showing 
similarities and differences amongst them from their legal practices, customs and traditions. 
Furthermore, the strategies, accessibility to medical care and implementation of ethical 
medical practices by health care practitioners will be examined to determine the reasons for 
the high incidence of medical negligence cases being brought against health care 
practitioners.  
Issues like access to health care services and a patient’s inability to pay for the required 
medical services should not be factors limiting the quality of services received nor should it 
reduce the value of ethical considerations on the part of the healthcare professional in his or 
her delivery of the service.   
 
In South Africa for example, the public health care system is underfunded and understaffed 
and is in contrast with a technologically advanced, well equipped private health care sector, 
which employs highly trained healthcare professionals and which serves the wealthier 
members of our population.
383
  
 
UK adopts the National Health Services program, which is funded by the government through 
general taxation and is a free public health care service to all its permanent citizens.
384
 Their 
private health system supports the public health care system.  
 
Canada has a universal health care system where the government assists their citizens by 
paying for their basic health services needed via a government health insurance plan. 
Additional services that do not fall under the government insurance plan, is paid for by the 
patient’s private health insurance.385  
 
                                                 
383
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The Australian government provides free in-patient public hospital care, access to medical 
services and prescription drugs. Private hospitals are available for elective procedures and are 
paid for by the patient’s private health insurance.386  
 
India offers its citizens free public health care but public hospitals are few and far between; 
their primary health facilities are poorly equipped and their private medical services are very 
expensive.
387
 The private sector is seen to treat the poor unfairly by not allocating enough 
mandated beds for them and advising the poor patients to pay for medical treatment because 
the private facilities are unable to provide the necessary health service according to 
government- mandated rates.
388
 In February 2018, the Indian Government declared ‘The 
National Health Protection Mission’ which will provide public health care/medical insurance 
coverage to improve the health status of 500 million impoverished families annually. 
389
  
 
 
3.1 SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Our Constitution and supporting legislation acknowledges that informed consent plays a 
pivotal role in every South African Citizen which respects and recognizes that these 
fundamental rights of autonomy and self-determination. We adopt the doctrine of Informed 
consent as a mechanism to protect individuals from medical procedures, interventions and 
treatments that require informed consent where it results in risk, harm or disempowerment of 
the patient and which inevitably violates numerous legal guarantees. 
  
In discussing South African cases, the decision in the leading case of Castell v de Greef
390
 is  
the precedent used in determining whether or not a valid informed consent
391
 has been 
obtained from the patient. It was further stated in that case, that the attending medical 
practitioner must take cognizance, be mindful of any and all material risks
392
 inherent in the 
intended planned procedure and to fully disclose to the said patient, such risks. This sets out 
an expectation under which informed consent in required. 
 
                                                 
386
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On the 3
rd
 October 1994, South Africa signed a multilateral treaty called the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and which came into force on the 10
th
 of 
March 1999. Of importance is Article 7 of the ICCPR is that it prohibits medical and 
scientific experimentation without explicit informed consent; and Article 9 of the ICCPR, 
which recognizes the rights to liberty, and security of the person.
393
  
 
Under Section 12 (2)(c) of the Constitution, participants identified for a research program 
must first give their informed consent prior to their participation.
394
 The National Health Act 
supplements the provisions of S 12(2)(c) of the Constitution by providing guidelines with 
regard to obtaining informed consent for experimentation or research on human subjects. The 
provisions of section 71 of the National Health Act requires a strict adherence to procedure 
when undertaking experimentation and research of children specifying procedures to be 
satisfied for both therapeutic and non-therapeutic research and or experimentation in 
children.
395
 
 
It is accepted that a doctor could justifiably deviate from the intended treatment in 
circumstances in which a patient having consented to a specific operation presents with 
another serious condition that was only discovered in theatre whilst the patient was under 
general anesthesia; the doctor then deviate from the informed consent obtained on justifiable 
grounds being: 
1. the decision to remedy the new problem is in accordance with good medicine; 
2. the remedy is conducted in good faith and will positively enhance the patient’s 
health and well-being by alleviating issues relating to the patient’s complaint; 
3. that it would not be seen to increase the patient’s material risk of harm; 
4. in situations when it would not favor the patient’s best interest to postpone the 
operation or procedure for another suitable occasion when a new consent would be 
in place.
396
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3.2  INDIA 
 
India, like many other countries, has departed recently, from their traditional paternalistic 
practice of medicine.
397
 It has moved instead towards an appreciation of patient autonomy and 
has put the patient on an equal footing with the doctor in the decision making process. 
398
 
They have embraced the concept of informed consent, and this transition has resulted in the 
creation of workable boundaries, and has moved the doctor-patient relationship in a more 
contractual direction.  
 
According to Section 13 of the Indian Contract Act,
399
 consent is seen as a contract whereby: 
‘two or more people agree upon the same thing in the same sense.’ Consent must be free of 
coercion, undue influence, fraud, misinterpretation or mistake and given by a person over the 
age of 12 years. 
400
 Additionally, Section 90 of The Indian Penal Code,
401
 indicates that no 
valid consent can be obtained from a person who is intoxicated, of unsound mind or below 
the age of 12 years,
402
 as is similarly proscribed in South Africa under Section 129 of the 
Children’s Act.403  
 
The Indian Statute Book
404
 does not legislate separately for men and women in respect of age 
limits regarding consent to medical procedures. Medical professionals rely on both Sections 
80 and 90 of the Indian Penal Code, thereby applying the law for consent in general terms, all 
in faith, when obtaining informed consent.
405
 The Indian Contract Act
406
 stipulates that the 
legal age for parties to validly enter into a contract is 18 years and this should be the threshold 
for giving valid consent to medical procedures.
407
 Any other law or statute cannot override the 
Indian Penal Code,
408
 and therefore the legal age for entering into medical contracts provides 
that the patient has the capacity to give an informed consent. 
A judgment in the case of Samira Kohli v Prabha Manchanda Dr. & ANR
409
 has laid strict 
guidelines for obtaining informed consent from patients in India. The patient in this case the 
patient consented only to diagnostic laparoscopy procedure, but was subjected to a 
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hysterectomy and removal of her ovaries under the same general anesthesia, without 
obtaining necessary consents from the patient. The consent for the hysterectomy was obtained 
from the patient’s mother. The court held the doctor liable for malpractice and stated that 
despite additional surgery being beneficial to the patient in ‘saving time, expenses, pain and 
suffering are no ground for defence.’410 Any acts performed in deviation of the authorized 
consent amounts to assault unless it is a life-threatening situation.
411
 Clause 13 of the Indian 
Medical Council Regulations
412
 clearly stipulates that the doctor prior to an operation is 
obliged to obtain their patient’s consent.  
After a long history of paternalistic practices in India we see that medical professionals have 
seen the value in adopting the route promoting patient autonomy and self- determination. 
However, the Supreme Court of India has ruled that the disclosure of information regarding 
the medical treatment, intervention and prognosis need not be a stringent test as outlined in 
the Canterbury case
413
 rather to be in accordance with the standards accepted as normal and 
proper as assessed by a body of skilled professionals in that field. The consent must depend 
on the patient’s physical state, mental state, the diagnosis, the planned intervention and the 
value attached to the treatment by the patient. Patients must understand what they are 
consenting to, must have the capacity to consent, must give such consent voluntarily and such 
consent requires a bare minimum knowledge of the intended procedure. This is “ Real 
consent” and is based on the concept as described by the Bolam test 414 which is currently 
being used and incorporated into practice having regard to the circumstances and realities in 
India.
415
 
 
3.3 ENGLAND 
 
The laws of England provide that a competent person who has attained 16 years of age may 
authorise a valid consent to medical examinations, treatment and procedures.
416
 
 
The English courts adopted the “Bolam Test” for negligence, which hold doctors liable if they 
fail to act in accordance with rules, regulations and opinions as prescribed by their Medical 
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411 D. Singh ‘Informed vs. Valid Consent: Legislation and Responsibilities’ (2008) 5 (2) Indian Journal of 
Neuropathy (IJNT). 
412 Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Ethics,& Etiquettes) Regulations -2002.  
http://old.miindia.org/RulesandRegulations/codeofmedicalethicsregulations2002 (accessed 01/06/2015) 
413 Canterbury v Spence supra 307  
414 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582. 
415 KK Agarwal ‘ Real consent and not informed consent applicable in India’ Indian Journal of Clinical Practice 
(2014) 25 (4) 392-393 Medilaw , medind.nic.in/iaa/t14/i9/iaat14i9/p392.pdf  (accessed 03-05-2018). 
416 C. Tidy ‘Consent to treatment in children’ Mental capacity and Mental Health Legislation’ (2015) Available at: 
https://patient.info/doctor (accessed 14-09-2017). 
 67 
Council.
417
 Currently, the courts in England (and Australia) are using a “reasonable patient” 
might expect rather than what a “reasonable doctor” might expect a patient to know standard, 
thereby enforcing stricter standards of risk disclosure for doctors.
418
 However, Lord 
Scarman’s minority view in the Sidaway 419  case highlighted the move away from the 
Bolam
420
 test in England showing a tendency to adopt a more stringent test of disclosure as 
outlined in the Canterbury
421
 case, regarding a doctor’s duty of disclosure and obtaining 
informed consent.  
 
Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority,
422
 in which the surgeon did not mention the risk of 
impotence following rectal surgery, illustrates that the Bolam
423
 test is undergoing a 
transformation and the courts are rejecting medical opinion found to be unreasonable or 
irresponsible.  
 
The court in Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust
424
 applied the “reasonable patient 
standard” and held that a doctor should normally disclose a significant risk that would affect 
the judgment of a reasonable patient. Lord Woolf further held that such disclosure of the 
significant risk of the medical procedure allows the patient the ability to determine for him or 
herself as to what course he or she should adopt thereby allowing such patients greater 
autonomy and individual rights.
425
 
 
In the case of Chester v Afshar
426
the plaintiff suffered from chronic back pain and 
communicated to her doctor that she wanted to try other options of pain relief with an 
operation being the last resort. Ms Chester was referred to a neurosurgeon who she alleges 
pressured her into having the surgery. The neurosurgeon failed to disclose the small but 
unavoidable risk of paralysis or confinement to a wheelchair, inherit in such a surgery. 
Further, he failed to offer her alternatives to surgery or to the option of obtaining a second 
opinion. The plaintiff could not feel sensation, nor could she move her body, post-surgery. A 
subsequent surgery was performed to determine the cause of the impairment, but could not 
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rectify the paralysis. The court favoured the importance of patient autonomy and held that the 
plaintiff had suffered a wrong as a result of the defendant’s non-disclosure of the material 
risks of the operation. A full disclosure of the risks would have granted her the opportunity to 
seek further opinions on her medical condition or choose to postpone the operation for a 
future date.
427
 
 
The General Medical Council in the United Kingdom has given the guidelines with respect to 
obtaining informed consent from patients undergoing medical procedures, including 
screening or diagnostic tests. A full disclosure of the purpose, the type of testing and it’s 
intent should be made available to the patient, as well as the probable and possible 
consequences of the intervention, and a plan of action once results are received, including 
how counselling, treatment and post-surgical support is to be given to the patient.
428
 
 
The legal expectations surrounding informed consent in England are similar to those of 
international and national countries and one can see that a basic ethical code is adhered to and 
where professionals are mindful of patient autonomy, self determination, ensuring good 
medical practice is adhered to by protecting patients from being coerced into medical, 
treatments, intervention or research void of their consent.  
 
 
3.4  AUSTRALIA 
 
The consent laws in Australia are similar to those of South Africa, England, Canada and India 
where competent adults can in common law consent to or refuse medical treatment. Where 
consent is seen to be absent there may be legal consequences for the health professional 
concerned as no one may be subject to a medical procedure without consent or lawful 
justification. 
 
 In the Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker
429
 the attending ophthalmologist, despite an 
enquiry by the patient of any possible danger to his ‘good-eye,’ failed to disclose to his 
patient the remote risk of ”symptomatic ophthalmia,” a rare but serious complication of eye 
surgery.
430
 The court found against the ophthalmologist and held that it was an important part 
of the doctor’s duty to disclose “material risks” such as the “possibility of symptomatic 
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ophthalmia,” which unfortunately for the patient rendered him blind.431 The court went further 
and stated that: 
 
‘A risk is material, if in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would likely to attach significance to it 
or if the medical practitioner is, or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.’ 432 
 
Further, risks whether or not they are considered life threatening must preferably be described 
objectively in terms of percentages rather than by subjective terminology.
 
Patients are then 
able to relate the value of the risk to their health status and their healing process.  
  
In the case of F v R
433
 a woman was advised by her gynaecologist to undergo a tubal ligation 
instead of a sterilization procedure to prevent further unwanted pregnancies. The procedure to 
diminish the reproductive capacity proved to be unsuccessful; a process of recanalization 
occurred and the woman fell pregnant. The woman sued her gynaecologist for breach of ‘the 
doctor’s duty to care’ and alleged that the doctor had not fully disclosed the risks to her, 
despite the procedure holding a failure rate of less than one percent.
434
 
 
The court did not apply the Bolam principle
435
 and held that the risk of failure of the tubal 
ligation operation was so low that a careful reasonable doctor would not have advised the 
patient of “the statistically low failure rate in the absence of a question from the patient.”436 
 
The case of Battersby V Tottman and The State of South Australia
437
 dealt with the issue of 
whether or not a full disclosure would be of value to a patient who is emotionally and 
mentally unstable. The patient was considered to be highly depressed and suicidal. A full 
disclosure would have been presumed to have had detrimental impact on the patient, if she 
refused the treatment, as she was considered to be a favourable candidate for long-term 
treatment at a mental institution. The court held in favour of the doctor’s clinical judgment to 
withhold vital information from patient. Clearly, Dr Tottman believed that the patient’s self-
determination and autonomy was diminished and such a decision was justified under the 
circumstances. Withholding of vital information must be clinically proven to be in the best 
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interest of the patient as it violates the legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent.
438
 Here, 
the doctrine of informed consent would have failed because the patient was unable to 
understand nor comprehend the value of the medical information.   
 
Skene and Smallwood,
439
 contended that despite the fact that Australian doctors had specific 
protocols regarding their legal duty to inform, which was formulated and produced by the 
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council in 1993, and despite the widely 
publicized case of Rogers v Whitaker
440
, a survey conducted in 1995 revealed a divergence 
between medical law and practice. The results suggested that the divergence was a 
consequence of the fact that medical professionals did not fully understanding their legal 
obligations regarding their duty to disclose.
441
  
 
Skene and Smallwood
442
 further discussed the findings of the High Court of Australia 
regarding factors that are important in deciding whether a risk from a procedure is material 
and must be disclosed to the patient: 
1. ‘ more likely and more serious harmful results must be disclosed. 
2. Complex interventions require more information, especially when being 
carried out in an apparently healthy person. 
3. When the patient desires for more information. 
4. When the risk involved is more important to the patient because of the 
medical condition or occupation.’443 
    
It is clear from the above discussion that he health professional is under a duty of care to 
provide such information as is necessary for the patient to give consent to the treatment, 
including all the material risks of the intended treatment and a failure to do so by the health 
professional may lead to civil liability for an adverse consequence of the procedure.
444
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3.5 CANADA 
 
The ethical code of conduct and legislation surrounding informed consent in Canada hold the 
same value as in South Africa and is based on the principles that everyone who has attained 
maturity, is of sound mind and who has voluntarily granted a valid consent may be subject to 
and participate in treatments, operations, research and diagnostic procedures that involves 
bodily interference.  
 
There is ‘an appalling maternal mortality statistic of Sub-Saharan Africa and the practice of 
female genital mutilation are rights issues’ and very prevalent.445 Female genital mutilation 
has become a global concern as this practice is seen to have spread over the western, eastern 
and northeast regions of Africa.
446
 Thus far over ‘100-140 millions women and girls have 
been subject to this harmful practice which denies these females full enjoyment of their 
personal, physical, psychological integrity, rights and liberties’.447  
 
Female genital mutilation is a cultural practice that is finding its way into our country via 
migrants from Sudan and other parts of Africa.
448
 Our South African Constitution recognizes 
the existence of cultural institutions
449
 and affords its citizens a right to culture
450
 which must 
be compliant with the Bill of Rights.  
South Africa has further enacted subsidiary laws to address and criminalize female genital 
mutilation; specifically section 12(2) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 explicitly prohibits 
genital mutilation of female children.
451
 
 
Canadian gynaecologists and obstetricians also face requests for female genital mutilation 
procedures in a clinical setting from those minority communities who still practice such, for 
safety reasons. Other shortcomings experienced in the Canadian health sector are issues 
relating to domestic violence against women, a shortage of maternal health care workers, 
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access to cervical cancer screening and noteworthy to mention, that although abortion is 
legalized in Canada, its is not available throughout Canada’s health care facilities.452 
 
The Canadian courts favour the ‘reasonably prudent patient test’453 in assessing a doctor’s 
standard of disclosure in obtaining informed consent from his or her patient. This test 
primarily assesses whether a patient informed of such risk will attach value to the risk and 
further whether the attending doctor aware of such risk to the patient, will share this 
information believing that the patient will attach value to the disclosure of the risk being 
communicated. 
 
In a leading case of Reibl v Huges,
454
 the Canadian court rejected the paternalistic approach to 
treatment and emphasized the need for a full disclosure of medical information to patients and 
leaves no room for a deviation from informed consent by the healthcare professionals. Mr. 
Reibl, the appellant, consented to a surgery to remove an occlusion in his left internal carotid 
artery. Although the surgery was conducted properly, Reibl suffered a massive stroke, which 
left him paralysed on the right side of his body and impotent. Dr Huges encouraged Reibl to 
undergo the elective surgery rather than as an emergency surgery. Based on the doctor’s 
advice, Reibl consented to the surgery, confidently believing the surgery would remedy his 
headaches and help him to perform better at work.  
 
The court held that the respondent did not sufficiently inform the appellant of all potential 
material risks, specifically paralysis and death. All material risks, even if the risks are small or 
remote, should have been discussed. A full disclosure of medical information by the 
respondent would have allowed the appellant to reconsider the surgery after assessing his 
reasonable concerns and might have elected to postpone the surgery for a date in the future.
455
 
 
The case of Hopp v Lepp
456
 further obliges a surgeon to fully inform the patient of all material 
risks, he or she should answer any questions regarding the risks of the procedure posed to him 
or her by the patient and further, without being questioned, to impart information regarding 
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the gravity of the procedure as well as any special or unusual risks that may result from the 
proposed intervention.
457
 
In the case of Pittman Estate v Bain,
458
 the Canadian court found that “the use of therapeutic 
privilege was unwarranted” where the doctor failed to disclose to the patient and his wife that 
he had contracted HIV from a blood transfusion. Here, the doctor submitted that his choice to 
withhold the truth about the patient’s HIV status was on account of the patient’s ongoing 
depression.  
The Canadian case of Adan v Davis
459
 dealt with cultural issues and informed consent where a 
28 year old refugee from Somalia who consulted a doctor for a gynaecological infection that 
required a drainage procedure but was instead negligently sterilized. The patient who did not 
speak any English, was assisted by a friend who acted as her interpreter during the 
consultation, believed that the procedure was supposed remedy her infection. 
460
  
The General Division of the Ontario Court of Justice held that informed consent rested on two 
important aspects, firstly, the patient’s ability to understand the information delivered by 
doctor and the patient’s ability to communicate with the doctor based on the understanding; 
secondly, that the duty to disclose must extend further than those patients who from the 
doctor’s same cultural background and who hold the same cultural beliefs. Further, to provide 
information that would be relevant to the patient’s decision, to fully inform the patient taking 
into consideration the patient’s cultural beliefs and expectations of patients who, in the similar 
circumstance would choose to know before submitting to a surgery.
461
 
  
Similar to other international jurisdictions, we see from the above discussions that in 
Australia and the United Kingdom consent is positively viewed as part of a doctor’s duty to 
care and a failure to obtain informed consent constitutes medical negligence whereas the 
South African and Canadian approach views a lack of consent as a violation of the patient’s 
physical integrity.
462
 
 
The matter of Adan v Davis
463
 highlights how the doctor failed to achieve the standard of 
informed consent solely on the grounds that he did not fully disclose the sterilization 
procedure to the patient in a language that she understood.
464
 Dr. Davis also failed to ensure 
that the patient knew of the alternate contraceptive methods available to her was, or even 
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inform her of the benefits, risks and/or consequence that followed the sterilization 
procedure.
465
  
 
There is a general requirement in both national and international jurisdictions that the 
patient’s right to autonomy, liberty, security in and control over their bodies and self- 
determination is of paramount importance and is in keeping with societal norms and values. 
As previously discussed, consent legitimizes medical treatment that would otherwise be 
assault, based on the maxim “volenti non fit injuria.”466  
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CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATURE, POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES; LOOKING INTO FLAWS IN MEDICAL PRACTICE  
 
 
Our South African legislation and policies promise the highest attainable standard of health 
but there is still a high incidence of medical negligence, domestic violence against women 
and children, lack of resources and information affording women fast and efficient maternal 
medical screening and treatment.
467
 Strict adherence to our legislation is not complied with 
because we still experience incidences of violation against women’s sexual and reproductive 
self-determination.
468
 
 
Stefiszyn states that Article 14 of Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women, (Women’s Protocol or Protocol)469 ratified by South Africa 
in 1996, offers a comprehensive protection of women’s reproductive rights including issues 
relating to sexual violence, early marriages and the escalating spread of HIV infections 
amongst young African women. It is ‘the first binding international human rights treaty to 
guarantee an abortion under qualified circumstances, as well as the right to be protected from 
HIV infection,
470
 A woman’s autonomy is respected when she is empowered by knowledge of 
her medical status thereby having control over her body and fertility. She has the liberty and 
security of her person in making informed decisions and medical treatment choices.
471
  
 
With the introduction of unaffordable medical indemnity insurance premiums by medical 
insurance companies, there is a trend for high-risk specialists, namely: gynaecologists and 
obstetricians, to abandon their field of specialization. The cost of indemnity coverage for 
individual specialists are estimated to be approximately R800 000-00 per annum owing to the 
increase in the number of medical negligence case being brought against them.
472
 
 
Pienaar
473
 states that the medical negligence claims being brought against doctors are 
increasing with some of the contributory factors being; the standard of health care has 
                                                 
467 Carte Blanche; feature story: ‘ Haemorrhaging Gauteng Health’ Estè de Klerk, Researcher: Jean-  
   Emile@≠GautengHealth, available at: cartebalanche.dstv.com/player/951884 (accessed on 22 November 2015). 
468 Carte Blanche; feature story: ‘ Haemorrhaging Gauteng Health’ Estè de Klerk, Researcher: Jean-  
   Emile@≠GautengHealth, available at: cartebalanche.dstv.com/player/951884 (accessed on 22 November 2015). 
469 Karen Stefiszyn ‘Health and reproductive rights, HIV, and the Protocol to African Charter on the Rights of 
Women in Africa’ (2011) 12 (4) ESR Review.  
470 Article 14(2)(c) of the Protocol to African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa. 
471 Karen Stefiszyn op cit.405 
472 M. Hesse ‘ Now local liability cover for doctors’ (2016) Business Report Available at : 
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/ (accessed 14-09-2017). 
473 L. Pienaar ‘ Investigating the reason behind the increase in medical negligence claims’ (2016)1(1) Scielo 
Available at: http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php (accessed on 30/10/2017). 
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dropped; a lack of communication between the doctor and the patient; and further, a high 
percentage of birth-related incidences of negligence.
474
 
 
With the rapid increase in medical negligence claims and the prudent-patient approach 
adopted in medical practice, medical professionals are seen to practice “defensive medicine” 
rather than “compassion-centered care” to safe-guard themselves from being sued.475 The 
defensive medicine strategy sees healthcare practitioners requesting more tests and scans in 
diagnosing the patient’s medical condition. 476  The focus of medical practice should be 
invested on patient well-being rather than guarding against potential law suits. 
 
Although the implementation of the general principles and ethical guidelines have been 
legislated and re-affirmed in the HPCSA guidelines, a recent Medscape Survey
477
 revealed 
that 85 percent of doctors in the fields of gynaecology and obstetrics are most likely to be 
sued among all physicians, of which 3 percent admit their failure to follow safety procedures 
or obtain informed consent. The survey further revealed that 15 percent of specialists, 
especially in the field of gynaecology and obstetrics, are in the main, reported by their 
colleagues rather than sued by them.
478
 
 
Carstens and Pearmain contend that in assessing medical negligence in South Africa, one 
must take into account the subjective training, experience and skill of the attending physician 
or medical practitioner against the objective circumstances of their locality under which they 
work and practice.
479
 South Africa’s medical training standards of medical care, access to 
health care and the availability of resources still remains inadequate, as there are shortages of 
medical staff and doctors in tribal, community and rural locations.
480
 
  
Doctors and physicians placed at these poorly equipped, rural and primary health care 
facilities are still obliged to treat their patients with the highest degree of skill and care. 
Carstens and Pearmain state that South Africa is a developing country, suffers discrepancies 
in the level of services due to lack of resources and infrastructure which compromises service 
delivery and affects the informed consent process.
481
 Our South African community needs 
law enforcement strategies that are able to ensure the proper use of allocated budgets 
                                                 
474 Ibid. 
475 Ibid. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Carol Peckham ‘Medscape Malpractice Report 2015. Why most doctors get sued.’ 9 December 2015 
http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/public/malpractice-report-2015#page=3 accessed 14-09-2017. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Carstens and Pearmain op cit. 59 
480 Ibid. 
481 Carstens and Pearmain op cit.59  
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financially support, supply and cater for the needs of its citizens by providing first world 
standards and health facilities. The strict adherence to our legislature, policies and practices 
by all parties concerned will successfully attain a higher quality health status and will reduce 
the law suits and claims being brought against the medical professionals by their patients 
and/or their representatives for poor and sub standard service delivery.  
 
The Health Professional Council of South Africa (HPCSA) is a statutory body, which was 
established under the Health Professions Act
482
 to regulate the profession. The council 
formulated standards and rules by which the health professionals ought to ethically practice 
their profession. The HPCSA guidelines and regulations are binding on its members and are 
used as a basis for identifying unprofessional conduct for disciplinary enquiry.
483
  
 
Disregard for the HPCSA protocol
484
 was shown by the defendant in the case of Isaacs v 
Pandie
485
 where the defendant testified that although he conducted his sterilization procedure 
according to the HPCSA guidelines, he does not usually take written consent from a patient in 
hospital, nor does he check and verify the signatures of his patients on the consent forms.
486
 
The defendant further admitted in his testimony that he was unaware of whether or not his 
colleagues took written consents from patients in hospital and/or checked the signatures on 
those consent forms as well. The court held that requirements were not met, that the 
defendant had failed to obtain a written consent and acted negligently in failing to check the 
consent forms as procedurally required by the HPCSA.  
 
In addressing the Isaac case, Samela, J found that the defendant failed to adhere to both the 
legislation and the HPCSA Regulations. The court held that the defendant had a mandate 
based on their contractual relationship entered into by himself and the plaintiff and was 
further under a legal obligation to obtain informed consent in terms of the Sterilization Act.
487
  
Traditionally, in the field of gynaecology and obstetrics, the first scan performed by the 
doctor or ultrasound is conducted, seemingly as a routine procedure without informed consent 
                                                 
482 Health Professions Act 56 of 1974. 
483 Booklet 9, Section 2. 1 of the HPCSA: Seeking Patient’s informed consent: The Ethical Considerations (2008) 
guidelines state that: ‘ Successful relationship between health care practitioners and patients depend upon mutual 
trust. To establish that trust practitioners must respect patient autonomy- their right to decide whether or not to 
undergo any medical intervention, even where a may result in harm to themselves or in their own death. Patients 
must be given sufficient information in a way that they can understand, to enable them to exercise their right to 
make informed decisions about their care. That is what is meant by informed consent.’  
484 Booklet 9, Section 10 of the HPCSA: Seeking Patient’s informed consent: The Ethical Considerations (2008) 
485 Isaacs v Pandie supra 197. 
486 Ibid. 
487  Isaacs v Pandie supra 197. 
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being legally obtained prior to the ultrasound procedures being conducted.
488
 These patients 
are led to believe that it is a normal, positive routine ante-natal medical procedure where the 
expectant mother looks in anticipation to view her baby’s little hands or feet. The actual 
reason for scanning is a negative one primarily because the gynaecologist is looking for 
abnormalities, handicaps or defects. Should defects and or abnormalities be detected then the 
expectant mother will likely be offered the option of tests and finally abortion.
489
 
 
Howarth
490
 identified the high probability of obstetric and gynaecology litigation in the 
future, especially in the area of “obstetric ultrasound and cervical cytology” and warns against 
doctors relying on the fact that their peers have traditionally by-passed the moral and 
mandatory procedure of first obtaining informed consent from the patient prior to 
interventions.
491
 
 
Stefiszen discusses the trauma effecting women subject to a sterilization procedure and states 
that compulsory, forced and coerced sterilization affects women both physically and 
emotionally. It further infringes upon her womanhood and her freedom to control her fertility, 
including her ‘rights to liberty, bodily integrity, the right to be free from discrimination.’492 
Stefiszen asserts further, that research conducted in Namibia by the International Community 
of Women Living with AIDS, showed that in those cases of forced sterilization or coerced 
sterilization, informed consent was not properly obtained. It illustrated that the consent was 
invalid as it was obtained under duress or in circumstances where a full disclosure of the 
medical treatment and intervention was absent. The women were led to believe that they 
would benefit from other medical procedures like abortions or Caesarian section delivery, 
only if the consent to sterilization procedure was signed.
493
 
 
Once again we see the growing need to create awareness, regulate and mandate medical 
professionals to incorporate as routine practice of obtaining informed consent within the field 
of gynaecology and obstetrics. The post-trauma both emotionally and physically has far 
reaching consequences and we should endeavor to create awareness and training amongst 
medical professionals by educating them on the invaluable implementation and adherence to 
the doctrine of informed consent. 
                                                 
488 SASUOG, Consent for early “routine” obstetric ultrasound : http://sasuog.org.za/consentforear.asp (accessed 14 
November 2015). 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid. 
491 Ibid. 
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Having regard for our common law rights embodied in the Bill of Rights under the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
494
 especially the right to dignity, psychological, 
bodily integrity and security, all protected and supported by NHA
495
, the HPCSA
496
 
Guidelines create a platform for a proper functioning health care system. Doctors have a legal 
responsibility and obligation to fully disclose all inherent risks, benefits, and alternatives prior 
to treatment. This study concludes that healthcare practitioners, especially those in the 
specialized field of gynaecology and obstetrics are inconsistent in their approach to informed 
consent despite their ethical and legal mandate. 
 
It is widely accepted that a patient who is informed about their health status, is able to 
exercise their autonomy and self-determination in choosing treatment options and remedies or 
may even choose to forego medical treatment altogether.
497
 In the previously discussed cases 
of LM and OTHERS v Government of the Republic of Namibia
498
, Christian Lawyers 
Association v Minister of health and Others
499
 and Isaac v Pandie
500
 the courts took note of 
women’s reproductive rights and their right to bodily integrity. In Christian Lawyers 
Association v Minister of health and Others the Appeal court examined aspects of the right, 
including the patient’s capacity, to provide the necessary informed consent.501In Isaac v 
Pandie the courts took into consideration the patient’s mental and emotional state, including 
their pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life. It was further held in both the LM and 
OTHERS v Government of the Republic of Namibia
502
 and Isaac v Pandie
503
 that it was the 
doctor’s duty to obtain informed consent from the patient; further, the court referred to the 
HPCSA guidelines which ‘ expressly states that it is responsibility of the doctor providing 
treatment to his/her patient to obtain consent’ and remains responsible for ensuring that the 
patient is given ample time to the understand the medical intervention, to consider the 
                                                 
494 Act No. 108 of 1996. 
495
 National Health Act 61 of 2003  
496
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benefits, risks and consequences of the medical intervention, to make an informed decision 
and to either grant or refuse consent.
504
 
 
Also noteworthy to mention, is the use of therapeutic privilege invoked by the doctor in the 
abovementioned case of VRM ibid. The doctor contended that he choose not to inform the 
patient of his decision to test her for HIV, as he did not want to impart information which was 
likely to affect her psychological and emotional state during the late stages of her pregnancy. 
This argument proved unsuccessful as the protocol in treating and dealing with people living 
with HIV, along with statutory requirements pertaining to HIV incidences with in South 
Africa, does not cater for the defense of therapeutic privilege. An infection with HIV is a 
deeply serious piece of health information, not only for the patient but also for society as a 
whole. The woman diagnosed with HIV has a legal duty to inform her partner of her status.
505
  
 
The defense of therapeutic privilege is unavailable for medical practitioners in situations 
where a patient consents to a particular procedure for an anticipated outcome or contingent 
upon a diagnosis. Patrick Van den Heever suggests that therapeutic privilege can be 
successfully used in treating patient’s suffering from psychiatric illness and where disclosure 
would cause serious harm to the patient. Doctors are therefore warned against fully disclosing 
medical information to those patients who present with signs or a likelihood of being unable 
to make rational decisions or choices. Further, a doctor who has invoked therapeutic privilege 
must show strong ground upon which they invoked it and they bear the onus of proving that a 
non-disclosure supports the best interest of the patient and protects patient autonomy.
506
 I 
believe that full disclosure supports the best interest of the patient as it promotes self-
determination and patient autonomy. 
 
Although the NCA
507
 and the HPCSA
508
 has implemented guidelines regulating the healthcare 
practitioners ethical and legal obligations, I believe that there is a dire need for introducing 
ethical, legal and communication during medical training at both undergraduate and post-
graduate levels. With advent of increasing number of medical negligence cases, one can only 
conclude that healthcare practitioners have limited knowledge of the legal and ethical 
requirements of informed consent or that they choose to be non compliant with consent 
regulations.  Creating a platform for education and awareness of past and current medical 
negligence cases amongst the medical professionals will encourage them to implement 
                                                 
504
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505 Ibid. 
506 Patrick van den Heever ‘Pleading the defense of therapeutic privilege’ (2005) 95 SAMJ 421. 
507
 National Health Act 61 of 2003  
508 Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) guidelines for good practice in the health care profession- 
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methods and use avenues to prevent the recurrence of similar or same medical negligence 
issues. 
 
 
One can strongly recommend that the faculties at Medical Colleges draw courses from the 
Social Sciences by way of introduction of a whole new module on communication skills,
509
 
psychosocial, socio-economically informed people-skills training, to specifically educate 
medical practitioners of their ethical obligations and of best practice towards their patients 
and their rights. My suggestion is derived from the courts findings in the case of Adan v 
Davis
510
 where it was asserted that not only do doctors have the duty to be culturally informed 
and to ensure that their patients fully understand the information that is imparted to them but 
also in situations where an interpreter is used, he or she must be attentive to the linguistic 
ability of the interpreter and ensure that the message is correctly conveyed by such 
interpreter.
511
  As previously mentioned, the court in the case of Jansen van Vuuren and 
Another NNO v Kruger
512
 held that the patients have the right to expect that their doctor 
complies with the professional guidelines therefore in keeping with the ethical guidelines, 
hospital consent forms must be redrafted to include the space for a written verification by the 
doctor or surgeon that informed consent was received for the procedure. This will ensure that 
the doctor did not use a delegate, like a nurse, to obtain the consent , he or she will be obliged 
to check and confirm that the consent or refusal of the procedure is granted and is on file prior 
to the procedure.  
 
The reinforcement of ethical and legal requirements must be incorporated throughout both 
practical and theoretical medical training, with a mind towards improving the status quo of 
cases of medical negligence. Although, the current courses dealing with community medicine 
and hospital placements may attempt to prepare graduating doctors to enter the field, they are 
inadequately equipped to deal with legal obligations, language barriers, cultural barriers 
stemming from differing norms and beliefs,
513
 socioeconomic circumstances of disadvantaged 
people, lack of resources within medical facilities, and still maintain a professional level of 
respect for patient autonomy and self-determination. Our doctors need a curriculum that 
deviates from a purely clinical background. Medical colleges need to arm graduates with 
unambiguous practice guidelines,
514
 educate them on uniformity of services and processes
515
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and to help adapt them to our heterogeneous South African nation and its needs by adapting 
their training to safeguard their patients and to safeguard their own careers given the 
increasing rate of claims against them. Efforts must be implemented to work towards 
affording patients with safe and effective treatment and to ultimately use the professional 
skills of our medical experts towards the best interest of the patient firstly. 
 
 
Currently, gynaecologists and obstetricians are considered high-risk specialists who are 
expected to pay higher medical indemnity insurance premium in the face of escalating 
medical malpractice and medical negligence claims being brought by patients, or by children 
disabled at birth, for example.
516
  
 
Practicing such a high risk specialty, in a country with limited resources but first world 
guarantees to service, these specializations have little choice but to incorporate into their 
curriculum, the people skills that would allow them to close the gap between what is 
promised and what is delivered to patients.  
 
 
Finally, to confidently answer the question: Apart from medical emergencies, when is it 
justified for gynaecologists, and obstetricians to deviate from informed consent without 
reverting back to their patients? One can only re-affirm that health practitioners cannot 
materially change the preauthorized medical plan of action or the terms of the consent, 
especially if the new treatment radically alters the patient’s health status. The doctrine of 
informed consent is a widely acknowledged obligation placed on the medical fraternity to 
ensure patient autonomy and sexual and reproductive self-determination is adhered to and 
respected. Gynaecologists and obstetricians cannot deviate from their mandate unless it is a 
medical emergency or their patients have voluntarily waived their rights to consent or where 
the healthcare practitioner is faced with a situation as described in terms of Section 7 of the 
National Health Care Act.
517
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Informed consent within the field of gynaecology and obstetrics is an integral part of the 
diagnostic-therapeutic process, and legitimizes the treatment process by granting the power of 
informed self-determination to the patient. A woman’s right to bodily integrity and 
autonomously pursue reproduction is consistent with section 12(a) of the Constitution ‘ to 
make decisions concerning reproduction’518 
 
With the development of the doctrine of informed consent in our South African law and 
international law, Gynaecologists and obstetricians must deviate from the historical practice 
of medicine in accordance with the Hippocratic customs, which encourages paternalism and 
the imbalance of power, including gender-relations and create a platform wherein female 
patient can exercise their autonomy during their treatment process, during their pregnancy, 
childbirth or healing process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
518
 Especially section 12(2) (a) : ‘Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes the 
right: (a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security and control over their bodily; and (c ) not be 
subject to be subject to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent’  
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